Upper South East Dryland Salinity and Flood Management Program

In the early 1990s, the network was considered essential by some (but challenged in a majority of submissions in the original consultation process, and indeed in the State Government's own Assessment Report, which, with earlier documents, comprised the officially recognised Environmental Impact Statement for the program) to control a predicted increase in dryland salinity and flooding.

By the mid 1990s, it should have been obvious that the prediction was grossly inaccurate, when watertables commenced their current falling trend. By the late 1990s, a trial drain removed less than 20% of the groundwater that had been predicted, and, in 2002, environmental damage (including soil structural failure, death of native vegetation, production of acid drain water, drying and salinisation of wetlands) caused by groundwater drainage was reported to the State Government.

Disturbingly, the program is also resulting in a net increase in greenhouse gas emissions of over a million tonnes a year (carbon dioxide, and its equivalent in methane and nitrous oxide), which far exceeds the amount of salt exported by the drain network (a little over a 100,000 tonnes per year). In turn, the salt exported by the drains is less than half that originating from rainfall which falls on or flows into the region every year(approximately 250,000 tonnes per year)!

In 2002, the proposed drainage program was reported to be unviable, even before environmental damage and increased capital costs for the network's construction were considered. Astonishingly, the current stage of drain construction was approved in 2003 after a State parliamentary committee was advised that the network would be viable (using figures considered "not realistic" in the economic evaluation)!

Furthermore, in 2002, legislation was passed by the State's Parliament that mandated the drain network, and which enabled 200m-wide drainage corridors (totalling about 13,000 hectares in area) to be compulsorily acquired without compensation. The responsible minister (John Hill) admitted in Parliament that the legislation was only required to ensure the cooperation of just one landholder in the region!

In 2006, the legislation was extended for another three years after the new responsible minister (Gail Gago) justified continued drain construction using a gross misinterpretation of advice provided by the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO).

And so the story goes on. The Government became preoccupied with and committed to a major engineering solution to an environmental problem that was not fully understood (indeed, it was receding naturally), and overlooked other considerably more effective and appropriate approaches to the environmental problems observed in the region. These include replanting perennial vegetation, restoring degraded soil health, reducing waterlogging using surface drains, and improving grazing management.

Absence of rigorous oversight

Have a look at the new "Stop the Drains" website, an initiative of farmers, who, with the local Tatiara District Council, South Australia's Democrats, Greens, and most recently the Liberals, have called for a stop to digging of the mandated drain and floodways network until an independent environmental audit is completed.

An independent audit is long overdue. Although it was an annual requirement of Commonwealth Government funding for the current stage of drain digging, and probably of Commonwealth legislation (click here and go to sections 22 to 34), the State Government has so far failed to provide evidence of any audits ever being conducted.

The responsible Minister was questioned on the subject on 20^th June in the State's Legislative Council (click here and go to the "National Action Plan" heading), but failed to provide an answer.

Two years ago, the program's environment manager was also unaware of the audit requirement, and more recently a Government official claimed not to be aware of any audit reports ever being produced.

Although the program has had a number of reviews, which lack the rigour expected of an independent audit, they all raised issues and concerns ... but had no impact on the program.

Examples of recent reviews include:

Several for the State Government in 2002, which observed that environmental damage was being caused by deep drains, that deep drains were considerably less effective than had been predicted in 1992, that watertables started falling naturally in 1995 before the first deep drain had been dug, and that the program was uneconomic when considering realistic economic and environmental costs.
A review of Natural Heritage Trust projects reported in 2006, which made many pertinent comments, including that there was a lack of science behind the program's salinity management targets, and that the salinity management approach adopted in South Australia differed markedly to that applied elsewhere. Why?
Four CSIRO position papers, in particular one, which reported that 50-90% of the region's dunes needed to be covered with deep-rooted perennial vegetation in order to revert to pre-saline conditions on the flats, without the need for an engineering solution. The paper was misinterpreted and used to justify continued drain digging by the Minister in 2006!
A Senate inquiry in 2006, when the State Government failed to demonstrate that the program's environmental and economic benefits exceeded its costs, despite being given six months to do so.

None of this information has been formally released to the public, nor apparently briefed to State parliamentarians. Nor ever been used to reassess the program's viability or appropriateness, and hence determine if the public are getting value-for-money for their compulsory investment!

The great drain robbery!

Farmers, led by cattle breeder, environmentalist and artist, James Darling, who was recently appointed a Member of the Order of Australia for services to conservation and the environment, thought that commonsense had finally prevailed, when drain digging was stopped in late May. That was until the responsible Minister certified a second change to enabling legislation in a month to allow digging to recommence on 19^th June!

The State Government demonstrated by this action that it gives highest priority to spending taxpayers' money and landholder levies on digging the final 300km of drains and floodways, than it does to having confirmation that the environment is not being damaged by actions initiated 15 years ago, using the law, and not rational argument, to support its position.

Recent farmer demonstrations were triggered by the State Government's insistence on digging the controversial Didicoolum (often incorrectly spelled Diddicoolum) Drain extension. The farmer's website describes their concerns, and provides reasons why they are demanding an audit of the program. You will also see photographs of land and wetlands that will be damaged by the drain, and wetlands already destroyed by other deep drains.

Of greatest concern to farmers is that the Government, especially the responsible Minister, has no interest in understanding why claims made by her officials on the benefits and costs of drains contradict, or are inconsistent with, information contained in her department's official reports.

Digging of the Didicoolum deep drain, which is part of a major drain network described by Government officials as Australia's largest infrastructure experiment, had been halted in early May when farmers alleged in a legal challenge that it was not properly authorised, contravened Commonwealth funding conditions, and was contravening environmental laws.

The farmers have suspicions that the science underpinning the program has also been misrepresented, misinterpreted, or suppressed, with the objective of sustaining support and funding for the program.

The proposed 30km long Didicoolum Drain extension is in the east of the Upper South East on the Marcollat Flat. At the southern end of the Marcollat Flat lies the world-renowned Padthaway wine region (a $100 million a year industry), where watertables have been falling dramatically.

Indeed, after over a decade of falling watertables across the region, coupled with a drying rainfall trend predicted to continue until at least the end of this century, the Government demonstrates extreme disregard for the environment. Most rational individuals would have identified flawed logic in a drain program intended to control rising watertables, when they have been falling naturally for well over a decade!

After the original legal challenge in early May, digging recommenced on 23^rdMay after the responsible Minister certified the enactment of an amended regulation, and bypassed a four month process that had been "inadvertently delayed" for six months. With the sweep of a pen, the Minister compulsorily acquired hundreds of hectares of land without compensation ... until she publicly denied knowledge of signing the certificate!!!

A few hours later, digging was stopped, this time on the order of the Supreme Court of South Australia, but a day later, the injunction was lifted on review. Supreme Court Justice Vanstone stated that, although a prima-facie case had been made that the regulation was invalid (ie not properly certified), the drain was seen to be part of a bigger project that was in the public interest.

The Government's Department for Environment and Heritage (1.3MB PDF file) and hundreds of farmers opposed to this and many other deep drains (proposed as well as already dug), argue that the drain program is NOT in the public interest! The Government's own reports also indicate that the drain program fails on four key tests of public interest - it is uneconomic, causes environmental damage, is divisive, and is inequitable.

Four days later (28^th May), and before digging had restarted, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier judgment and decided in favour of the farmers who brought the action. This time digging was suspended until properly approved changes to Government regulations occurred. These changes were certified in a second amended regulation by the responsible Minister in a process normally reserved for "minor and inconsequential matters", and which again bypassed the normal four month review and approval process! The revised regulation was Gazetted on 14^th June, allowing digging to recommence on the 19^th June.

Farmers, who believe that science has identified more effective methods of protecting agriculture and the environment from the effects of dryland salinity and flooding, had already defeated an arrogant Government that hides behind the "science", but withholds it from public scrutiny. Bullying of those who question the Government's claims, with threats of jail, fines, and "buckets and buckets of capsicum spray", is not how to convince farmers about the "science" behind the program.

The Democrats, Greens, and now the opposition Liberal Party, have called for an independent inquiry into the program. The Democrat member of the State's Legislative Council, where the Labor Government lacks a majority, on 30^th May moved a motion to disallow (click here and search for 10 May) the Minister's first amended regulation, a day after it was tabled in Parliament.

Motions for disallowance can occur up to 14 sitting days (in this case, as late as August or September 2007) after a regulation is tabled. A vote on the first motion has still not occurred, and is unlikely to occur before the 20^th June. By law, the second revised regulation must be tabled within six sitting days (which could be as late as 26^th July), and a vote on a motion of disallowance (if one is made) may not occur until September 2007.

By then, the drain will have been dug, farmers will have had their rights trampled on, the Government will have attracted considerable adverse publicity, an independent environmental audit could have been completed, and, if the regulation is disallowed, the Government's actions would have been illegal!

Why is the Government so concerned to finish digging urgently that it is willing to accept all of these risks, and to use the law, and not environmental arguments, to support its case? One can only conclude that it does not want to know the truth, that farmers, scientists, environmentalists, and some Government officials, have been trying to tell it for 15 years.

Enabling legislation for the drain program, including the original subordinate regulation, was passed in 2002, primarily to ensure the cooperation of just one landholder in the Upper South East! You may find this unbelievable, but the justification is recorded in the Hansard transcript of the debate on the bill. Click here for more details.

The enabling legislation provided Government officials with the authority to dig the drains, by compulsorily acquiring corridors of land (totalling 655km in length and 200m wide) without compensation to farmers. The legislation also protected Government officials associated with the drain program from liability or responsibility for damage caused by the drains, which lies squarely with all local farmers. The Government's ability to pass responsibility for its actions on to farmers appears to be another reason why program managers demonstrate little interest in the farmers' concerns.

In 2006, the legislation was extended for another three years, this time with more drain digging justified by misquoting CSIRO advice. The legislation, and misinterpreted and misrepresented science used to justify it, have been the root cause of almost all of the drain program's problems to date.

When challenged in Parliament on 30^th May (click here for the transcript and search for CSIRO) on the Government's "(mis)interpretation" of CSIRO's advice, the responsible Minister ducked the question and invoked the "REM defence". But the "REM defence" quickly sounded hollow, because REM (a "consulting company with extensive qualifications and experience in environmental engineering, hydro-geology, hydrology, environmental science and soil science" used by the Government) had written two years ago of its doubts about the accuracy of modelling done for the Government, in particular in support of the design of the Didicoolum Drain extension!

On the latest count, supporters of the Didicoolum Drain extension are outnumbered by its opponents by more than twenty to one, and yet the Government justifies more drain digging by claiming the community wants drains, and, of course, that the "science stacks up"!

Supporters of deep drains promote their benefits for agricultural productivity (undoubtedly some have benefited), and criticise anybody who claim the benefits are grossly exaggerated and information on their economic and environmental costs has been deliberately suppressed. The critics of the farmers, scientists, and Government officials, who challenge the Government's claims and have been forced to demonstrate, conveniently forget that levy-paying Upper South East landholders, and State and Federal tax-payers, have every right to demonstrate, because they are all paying for the drains to be dug!

Many contradictions!

An extensive deep drain network became inflexibly locked in by government officials in the early 1990s as the central component of a solution to halt rising groundwater in the Upper South East. Rising watertables, and the associated problems of dryland salinity and flooding, had been attributed to government-promoted and -mandated clearance of native vegetation since the mid 1900s, and were predicted in 1992 to become worse without deep drains.

However:

After rising for a short period, watertables commenced a natural falling trend in the mid-1990s before the first drain was dug,
groundwater removal by a trial deep drain in the late 1990s was measured to be 80% less than predicted,
irreversible damage was caused to soils by deep drainage,
many temporary and permanent wetlands were drained, and some poisoned with saline water,
irrigation and stock bore water levels dropped,
drain construction and maintenance costs blew out,
predicted benefits fell markedly and the program was assessed to be unviable,
in 2002 only 8% of landholders reported having problems with dryland salinity, and
dryland salinity was rated less of a land management issue than weeds, animal pests, and soil health!

But the South Australian State Government ignores these and many other facts and doggedly continues to construct its damaging, expanding (last estimate $59 million for 850 km of drains) and now mandated network, usually citing historical and flawed concerns and predictions as the justification.

The responsible Minister claims that the "science stacks up" and she will not change her mind. She, or at least her advisers, seem totally reliant on the Upper South East Dryland Salinity and Flood Management Program's 1993 draft Environmental Impact Statement and Management Plan to justify continued drain construction. Minister, this is not the Environmental Impact Statement for the program, as you refer to it in your recent press release!

The officially recognised Environmental Impact Statement also comprises a Supplement Report produced in 1994 and an Assessment Report produced in 1995. Both reports identified major deficiencies in the original draft Environmental Impact Statement and Management Plan, and can be found on the drain program's website, and contained numerous recommendations that appear to have been "inadvertently overlooked".

Not only that, the Minister remains totally reliant on a handful of landholders, and not her expert scientists, to publicly argue the case for her, an action that has seriously divided the community. Where are the expert scientists you claim have been advising you? Let's hear from them for a change. Perhaps you and your staff might then regain some of your lost credibility, and the major divisions in the community you caused might start healing.

Even better, let us see the science that you claim demonstrates that a deep drain network is needed in the Upper South East, and that other options are inappropriate. Perhaps you can also explain why about 30 scientific and analytical reports prepared for the program have not been released to the public by your Department of Water, Land and Biodiversity Conservation. These include an assessment of deep drain performance and nine background papers produced in 2002 to support (in fact, they should have had the opposite effect!) the current stage of drain construction, and four CSIRO position papers requested by your Department in 2005 to ensure that "a clear message is provided to all Upper South East landholders and to help address the misinterpretation of information".

All of these reports describe emerging inconvenient truths on the program, but they still remain hidden from the public, and presumably also from the parliamentarians who supported the extension to the program's enabling legislation in 2006.

Perhaps you can also explain why you misquoted one of the CSIRO position papers last year when you justified continued drain construction in the debate on the extension to the program's enabling legislation! Read the original paper, not the one edited by your staff, to see what CSIRO actually wrote. Click here for more details.

Based on official records provided to landholders, you should also note that the scheme is not removing 250,000 tonnes of salt a year as advised to Parliament in 2006 - the average over the past two years was about 110,000tonnes/year, and the six-year average was under 160,000 tonnes/year. Click here for more.

Why is your Department withholding water-related information from the South Australian public? This action is not isolated to the drainage program, because it also appears to apply to documents on the Wellington Weir, which are not being released because the Department claims it is "not in the public's interest". Having had access to many of the Department's "secret" drain documents, including a CSIRO report on predictions of the effects of the proposed Bald Hill drain (first published in November 2004 and still not released to landholders after being promised two years ago), the answer is obvious ... their release is not in the interests of the Government's case for the Upper South East program!

Minister, also please read your Department's latest report on the fresh water connectors' proposal and explain how an average of 15gigalitres/year of water available for diversion to the Upper South East became 20-50 gigalitres/year advised to the Commonwealth Government and now reported as an initiative of the National Water Commission. The connectors were added to the program to repair massive environmental damage caused by the program's deep drains dug over the past decade, the Fairview Drain dug as part of the program in 1998, which intercepted and diverted surface water directly out to sea, and by drains dug earlier in the Lower South East. Why has the connectors' proposal been treated administratively as a separate project to the deep drain program? Presumably, because to have treated it as an extension to the program would have invited a thorough review of both under current Commonwealth environmental laws!

Minister, you recently claimed on radio that 80 years of drain construction and management experience has been a great benefit to the design of drains in the current network. If so, then why did your program's infrastructure manager in September 2005 write the following? When commenting on studies in support of the design of the Didicoolum Drain extension, he wrote "It would be good (one day) to see the groundwater models actually represent what happens in the field", and provided a reason why drain modelling was over-estimating drain performance by up to five times.

Some landholders have also been advised by program staff that a recently constructed drain was over-designed by up to ten times! In other cases, drain banks are collapsing and blocking drainage flows (see top photograph), because your staff again ignored the advice of CSIRO, and even another of your agencies.

However, common sense and hard facts are showing signs of prevailing over Government misinformation, with the opposition Liberal Party joining the Democrats and Greens in a call for an independent audit of the program.

In the mean-time, concerned landholders wait impatiently for the governing Labor Party to concede that the science does not stack up, and that further drain construction should be halted until an independent inquiry (preferably exploring all scientific, technical and economic issues) into the program is completed. An inquiry might expose a number of unwanted facts about the program, but isn't this what a democratic and accountable government should aspire to?

An annual audit was a condition of Commonwealth funding for the program (in a recent radio interview, somebody close to the program claimed that numerous audits have already been conducted), so perhaps the Minister could start by releasing the most recent report!

Off the rails

The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change recently confirmed that global warming is here to stay, and reinforced CSIRO's 1990 and 2003 predictions that rainfall in South Australia's South East will continue to decline (a reduction of 100-150mm in 50 years) for at least another 50 years.

The State Government's own database of South East watertables shows that they have been falling for over a decade, and are now similar to or lower than when records began.

In addition, by 2002:

an overwhelming majority of landholders claimed that dryland salinity and flooding were not land management problems or issues for them,
the State Government's trial Upper South East drain under-performed by more than 80%,
damage to wetlands, native vegetation and soils caused by deep drainage was being reported, and
the drain network was determined to be uneconomic when realistic costs were considered.

However, despite this compelling evidence, the South Australian State Government is still hell bent on completing construction of the contrived, uneconomic and damaging Upper South East deep drain network, which was conceived in 1993 to rescue the region from dryland salinity and flooding .......... caused by rising watertables!

A 2003 State Government objective to minimise drainage flows into the Ramsar-listed Coorong, in order to preserve its hyper-saline condition, has also been reversed. Now, the objective is to maximise flows! A recent proposal to divert the dwindling (annual flows have nose-dived to about 5% those of 30 years ago), nutrient-rich drain water of the Lower South East through the Upper South East to revive its drying and dying wetlands, including the Coorong, is expected by many to have the opposite effect.

You read correctly. Deep drains have been dug, and are still being dug, to remove "excess saline" groundwater from the region, and wide, shallow drains ("floodways" is the friendly term) are now being proposed to bring "fresh" water into the region to compensate for the loss of good quality water for the wetlands caused by the deep drains!

Instead of rethinking the original drain strategy (which is the cause of many current environmental problems), the State Government insists on interfering unnaturally and unsustainably with the environment, with intuitive fixes that will lead to more problems in the future, that will require more fixes ... and so on, until the cycle is broken.

The planned diversion of low salinity water through the existing deep drains of the Upper South East also adds risks of turbidity, thus encouraging the development of algal blooms, of acidic reactions resulting in suspended heavy metals, and of deoxygenating the water as it reacts with sulphides concentrating in the base of current drains. The environmental damage caused by these polluted waters is the reason why similar drains are being filled in in other states and overseas.

Landholders are being charged (without compensation for loss of land) more than 50% of the cost of the current stage of drain construction, with levy inequities resulting in northern catchment landholders subsidising potential beneficiaries in the central and southern catchments.

To add to the ongoing farce, irrigators in the east of the region several kilometres from any drains are being levied for drain construction, because, the State Government claims, they contribute to the region's non-existent problem of rising watertables. The irrigators are also paying levies to extract groundwater for irrigation, and the State Government is now planning to reduce their entitlements, because their watertables are falling too rapidly!

Clearly realising they wouldn't receive cooperation from landholders for their ill-conceived and contrived program, State Government bureaucrats persuaded parliamentarians in 2002 to pass legislation to mandate the final stage of construction of a now expanded deep drain network (blown out and costing landholders three times more than originally agreed). This is despite the existence of still current legislation that would have allowed drains to be constructed democratically. Mandated construction of drains was supported by the State's parliamentarians because they were advised incorrectly that dryland salinity was growing, and that a deep drain network would provide a cost-effective cure.

In late 2006, and apparently ignorant of growing (but suppressed) officially-reported science and analysis that would have advised to the contrary, the State's parliamentarians extended the 2002 legislation to enable the State Government to continue its program for another three years. The extension debate was riddled with misinformation and misunderstandings about the drainage program.

Community concerns in the early 1990s over the threats from dryland salinity and flooding continue to be used by program staff (and recently the responsible Minister) as justification for the deep drain network. They conveniently forget that the community concerns were whipped up by grossly inaccurate State Government predictions on the growth and impact of dryland salinity, by over-stated benefits of deep drains, and by their under-stated economic and environmental costs. They also overlook the two-thirds of landholders (and a number of government agencies) who expressed concerns about or opposed the deep drain network in 1993 (now three times larger).

But watch this space. Although the original case for deep drains has evaporated, a new case is probably now being fabricated, which is likely to argue that deep drains will be needed to counteract the effects of rising watertables caused by the reinstatement of environmental flows into the Upper South East.

While at first sight the case for the proposed floodway drains appears marginally more sound than the case for deep drains, it also attracts serious risks. Additional questions that need to be asked of program staff and parliamentarians are: where are the expected "20-50GL" environmental flows going to come from, when flows in the Lower South East's major drains have diminished to a fraction of this value; what guarantees are there that the pollution of flows experienced in other states and overseas will not occur in the Upper South East; and what will be the ongoing maintenance costs of the proposed floodways and associated drains, and who will be paying?

There are many other solutions to the problems of dryland salinity and flooding, and they don't involve deep drains and result in wetlands being deprived of environmental flows. These solutions were either not considered, or were dismissed, one can only conclude because they would have undermined the case for this big engineering project (described until recently by State Government officers as the largest infrastructure experiment ever conducted in Australia).

The recent acknowledgement by the Premier that the State's water management programs have been deficient is welcomed. However, his announcement that the State Government has committed an additional $14million (half from the Upper South East program) of taxpayers' and landholders' money on the construction of drains to divert the non-existent "20-50GL" Lower South East drainage water north to help restore Upper South East wetlands (and to correct problems caused by past and current construction of drains in the region) needs to be challenged and tested vigorously.

Politics of drains

Brief history of the program

The objective of the drain network in the early 1990s was to "reverse current trends of land degradation and consequent economic decline caused by salinity and flooding", which were predicted to increase. However, by the mid 1990s, groundwater levels (which the government claimed were generally rising, and led to the predictions) continued or commenced their current general falling trend.

By 1997, CSIRO reported that the area of the Upper South East affected by dryland salinity was 20% less than recorded in 1992, and, in 1999, a trial deep drain (constructed to satisfy a requirement of the program's environmental impact statement) removed 80% less groundwater volumes than predicted.

An audit conducted in 2000 broadly confirmed the original 1992 estimates of land "affected" by dryland salinity, and "at risk" of becoming saline, but using methodologies now recognised nationally as grossly flawed, and which were not validated by detailed ground truthing. The estimates are still quoted by program staff as representing land "degraded" by dryland salinity, a word not even used in the 1992 and 2000 reports.

Program staff continue to provide subjective examples of how a few Upper South East landholders have turned "degraded" saline land into productive agricultural land, in order to demonstrate the benefits of deep drains. They ignore the inconvenient majority of landholders who claimed in 2002 that dryland salinity and flooding were not land management problems or issues for them, without deep drains.

Many Upper South East landholders adapted their land management practices in the 1990s so that land still classified by the State Government as degraded is now highly productive and healthy. Two of these inconvenient success stories can be read by clicking here (1.2MB PDF file, Muller (2003)) and here (1.7MB PDF file, page 6, Munday (2006)).

The photograph below illustrates the adverse effects of over-drainage on the pasture described by Muller (recommended by program staff for sowing on drained saline land). What was once a low maintenance and highly productive grazing paddock, with pasture capable of growth in saline and waterlogged (in fact, submerged for three months and more) conditions, is now dying (light brown area) up to 200m from the deep drain on the right.

Salt patches are still evident less than 10m from this drain, and extensive areas of land remain saline beyond 150m.

In 2002, the State Government was informed that deep drainage was damaging wetlands, native vegetation and soils in the region, and that the proposed network was not viable, even before factoring in updated figures for a declining dryland salinity and flooding threat, poorer drain performance, unexpected environmental damage caused by drainage, and increased capital costs for drain construction! Also, proportionally fewer Upper South East landholders than for the State as a whole considered dryland salinity to be a land management issue, and less than 8% described it as a problem!

Major differences between what had been predicted in the early 1990s and what was being observed and reported a few years later did not result in the viability and effectiveness of the program being thoroughly re-evaluated, even though the program's environmental impact statement and assessment report clearly identified this as a key requirement before committing to the implementation of the full drainage scheme.

Despite the existence of legislation that still provides a democratic means of progressing drain construction, and amid false claims that dryland salinity was still growing and that the drain network would result in a doubling of productivity in the region, the State's Parliament passed the Upper South East Dryland Salinity and Flood Management Act in 2002. The Act enabled the compulsory acquisition of land for an expanded drain network, did not compensate landholders for their confiscated land, enabled landholder levies to be increased nearly three-fold from the $6 million agreed with landholders in the mid 1990s, and protected government officers from liability for their actions.

Fortunately, a community concern that the Act cancelled the provisions of other State and Commonwealth acts and regulations is not valid. Amongst other things, these still require public servants to at all times act honestly in the performance of their duties, to not misapply or improperly use public money, and to use resources efficiently and effectively.

In 2003, the State's Public Works Committee approved an expansion of the network to 655km of drains (the original proposed network was 270km), after being incorrectly advised on the program's environmental and economic benefits and costs. In 2003, a State Government objective of the program was also to minimise Upper South East drainage flows into the Coorong, in order to preserve the Coorong's hyper-saline condition. By 2005, the State Government performed its now well known back flip, and changed the objective to maximising drainage flows into the dying Coorong!

By 2007, funding of a proposal to divert floodwater from the Lower South East through Upper South East wetlands to the Coorong, to supplement Upper South East drain flows, was approved by the Commonwealth Government. Scientific opinion remains divided on whether this will add to the environmental damage already caused by the Upper South East program.

Conflicting science

Major differences of opinion on the causes, effects and impact of dryland salinity were described in 2004 in a House of Representatives report on salinity, were reviewed again in a recent Senate report (which also reported on the South Australian Government's failure to demonstrate that the Upper South East program's benefits outweighed its economic and environmental costs), and were broadcast on TV in May 2006.

The science is split between the views of an influential group of hydrologists and hydrogeologists, which claims that changes to the water balance of groundwater flow systems caused by clearance of native vegetation from higher ground is the primary cause of dryland salinity, and the views of a growing group of scientists and land managers, which has demonstrated that degraded vegetation cover and soil structure on lower ground are the primary causes.

The first group's theory leads to the conclusion that replanting higher elevation recharge areas with deep-rooted perennial vegetation should restore the water balance, and if this is not feasible, more costly groundwater drainage of low lying areas might need to be considered. The second group's theory leads to the conclusion that improving vegetation cover and soil structure on land at risk or affected by dryland salinity will eliminate or minimise its adverse affects. Many experienced observers, including scientists and land-managers, consider that both theories are valid, but represent limited cases of what should be a general model of dryland salinity.

Conclusions derived from the first theory have attracted by far the most federal and state funding for environmental repair programs (nation-wide totalling well over a $1 billion). The Upper South East program has received nearly $75 million of public money (including landholder levies of $18 million), of which $45 million is just for drain construction, and only $400,000 has been to saltland agronomy.

For a lower cost, all of the Upper South East's higher elevation recharge areas could have been planted with deep-rooted perennial pastures (eg lucerne), which would have generated an immediate return to landholders, without the high long-term costs associated with deep drain maintenance. Funds would have been left over to construct a network of shallow, low maintenance drains, to address waterlogging in poorly drained areas, and ensure water quality was maintained for use in wetlands.

As a result of growing landholder, departmental and government agency criticism of the Upper South East Program in 2005, the Chief of CSIRO Land and Water was invited to provide a position paper that would ensure "a clear message is provided to all Upper South East landholders and to help address the misinterpretation of information". Four CSIRO position papers were produced in late 2005, and none have been released to landholders, because they did not provide the clear message that program staff wanted landholders to hear!

The Upper South East Act

Ignoring the growing number of adverse reports on the program, a bill to extend the term of the Upper South East Dryland Salinity and Flood Management Act 2002 from four to seven years was debated and passed by the South Australian Parliament, and assented to by the Governor in late 2006. Upper South East landholders (and Australian tax-payers who are contributing a further $28 million to the drain network's construction) will be appalled at the quality of the debates, which were riddled with misinformation, and misleading and selective comments. Details will be published in a later update.

Transcripts of the 2006 debates can be accessed from the Legislative Council (31 August; 19, 21 September; 31 October; 1, 2, 16 November) and House of Assembly (14, 15, 16 November) Hansard webpages (then search for upper south). Alternatively, summaries of parliamentary debates and announcements made in 2006 with relevance to the Upper South East are contained in PDF files, the location of which can be obtained from the webmaster.

During the debate on the original Upper South East bill in 2002, the Minister for the Environment and Conservation also told Parliament that the Act was only needed to control one named landholder in the region. Disenfranchising all Upper South East landholders appears to have been of lesser concern!

The Minister also advised Parliament that without drains, dryland salinity would increase (even though watertables had been falling for a decade) and, with drains, productivity would double (three-quarters of the network has now been constructed, and agricultural productivity in the region has declined)!

Only four South Australian parliamentarians (Senator Dana Wortley - Labor, Mr Mitch Williams - Liberal, Hon Sandra Kanck - Democrats, and Hon Mark Parnell - Greens) demonstrated serious interest in the Act and have challenged the assertions of program staff. Three parliamentarians spoke in support of the Act's extension (Hon David Ridgway - Liberal, Hon Andrew Evans - Family First, and the current Minister for the Environment and Conservation, Hon Gail Gago - Labor). Parliamentary support for the extension bill was along party lines, which is more a reflection of each major party's past, misguided support of the program, than with ensuring the achievement of positive environmental outcomes for the region.

A public relation's disaster

The drainage program has turned into a major public relations' disaster for the State Government, which seems to be of no concern to the majority of State parliamentarians. Go to the media reports webpage to read how the drain component of the program and related topics are being reported. The lack of open and honest reporting by the State Government on the real economic and environmental benefits and costs of deep drainage has attracted major criticism from landholders and scientists alike.

Reports that government scientists have been prevented from talking publicly on their concerns about the program, and that landholders might be required to pay Capital Gains Tax on compulsorily acquired land returned to them after drain construction (nearly three years after drains were constructed and fenced in the Northern Catchment, surplus land has still not been returned to the original owners), have added to the dismay landholders feel about the Program.

The Upper South East

The Upper South East Dryland Salinity and Flood Management program area lies 300km south-east of Adelaide, and measures about 100km from south to north. Up to 50% of the South East (comprising Upper and Lower South East) was permanent or seasonal wetlands prior to European settlement, as a result of naturally high watertables, slow natural surface and groundwater drainage, and relatively high rainfall, in particular in the south.

The Upper South East Program Area
adapted from Howieson (2003) - click on picture for a more detailed image.

Surface water in wet seasons flows across the two to 10km wide flats in a westerly direction, and is redirected in a north-westerly direction on the eastern edge of dune ranges aligned parallel to the coast. The water then flows slowly through chains of wetlands to a discharge point into the Coorong's South Lagoon at Salt Creek, or accumulates in wetland termini in the north of the region.

Underlying the region, groundwater within an extensive regional flow system comprising interconnected unconfined aquifers flows slowly west to the coast. The groundwater flow system under the Upper South East extends from the coast to about 600km to the east (click here for maps and descriptions of different flow systems). Only the area to about 200km east of the coast appears to contribute to groundwater and surface water flows into the region (see Murray Darling Water Budget Project webpage and MacKenzie and Stadter (1992) 7MB PDF file)).

Salt has always been a natural feature of the Upper South East. The region was under the ocean several thousand years ago (the dune ranges parallel to the coast were formed when the sea retreated to the west). Salt is also brought into the program area in rain at about 100,000 tonnes per year, and up to 150,000 tonnes of salt per year falls on the catchment to the east and in the south, with a large proportion of this flowing into the program area in surface and groundwater flows!

Evaporation and evapotranspiration (by vegetation) of water results in soluble salts (mainly sodium salts) becoming increasingly concentrated in surface water on its slow journey to the Coorong, and in groundwater on its even slower journey to the ocean in the west.

Post European settlement

Commencing in the mid 1800s, surface drains constructed in the higher rainfall Lower South East diverted flood water directly out to sea. These drains allowed highly fertile land to be used for agriculture, but reduced natural surface water flows through the Upper South East. This in turn reduced recharging and flushing of the region's wetlands, and the transportation of salt to the Coorong.

Large-scale clearance of native vegetation (mandated by the State Government), especially from the ranges, further upset the region's hydrological balance.This became a major problem when extensive areas of deep-rooted lucerne (which replaced the native vegetation) were killed in the 1970s by a combination of drought, aphids, grass hoppers, and over-grazing, especially by sheep.

Increased leakage of rainfall beyond the root zone on the ranges resulted in salt that had accumulated under the previous, more water-efficient, vegetation to be flushed to the groundwater. Increased groundwater recharge under the ranges also caused watertables on the flats to rise, bringing dissolved salts previously held low in the groundwater closer to the land surface.

The rising groundwater theory of dryland salinity is disputed by many scientists, who claim that watertables in the Upper South East have always been high, and that it is loss of vegetation cover (caused by farmers replacing native vegetation with grazing pastures that are intolerant to periodic waterlogging and salinity), a breakdown in soil structure (caused by inappropriate agricultural practices, such as excessive tillage, compaction of soils, and a failure to treat sodicity), and too rapid draining of land (which prevents salts accumulating near or at the surface of land being effectively flushed back to the watertable), that have caused areas of dryland salinity to expand and contract in the past.

The soil health theory is supported by many Upper South East farmers who are effectively suppressing the adverse effects of dryland salinity on their properties through effective agronomic practices. It also provides an explanation why some properties are almost completely free of dryland salinity, and why neighbours still report an expanding problem when watertables under the dunes have been falling in the region for over a decade.

During periods of high temperatures and low rainfall, the more soluble sodium salts become increasingly concentrated near and at the land surface as water is extracted and transpired by vegetation, is directly evaporated at the land surface, or is evaporated after being drawn up by capillary action to the land surface from the watertables.

Degraded soil structure leads to large capillary rise distances (measured in metres rather than centimetres for well structured soils), to low permeability and a decreased ability of rainfall and surface water to flush salts down the soil profile back to the groundwater, and to greater watertable rise in response to recharge. Poor vegetation cover also leads to increased evaporation, and hence more rapid build up of salts at the land surface. The cycle of soil structure breakdown, loss of vegetation, leading to increased susceptibility of the land becoming saline, becomes difficult, and in some cases impossible, to break cost-effectively.

However, many different forms of highly productive salt-tolerant vegetation have been adapted and exploited for stock fodder in saline areas, both nationally and internationally. Land management practices that control and reverse soil structural decline should also provide sustainable and productive options for many landholders in the Upper South East. Modest levels of salinity can be tolerated by some pastures, native vegetation, and saline soils are generally better structured than saline soils that have been drained! These natural land management practices have minimal detrimental impact on the environment, unlike the deep drains promoted by the South Australian government.

Challenging the claims on dryland salinity and deep drains

Exaggerated threats

Increasing areas of salinised land "following the 1988 floods and successive years of winter flooding" resulted in "expressions of concern from the local community" (NRC (1993) Part 1 2.4MB PDF file).

However, O'Driscoll (1960) in his review of the region already noted extensive areas of saline land and groundwater prior to land clearance, which was attributed in the early 1990s to causing rising watertables and a growth in dryland salinity and flooding. A description of the region in 1866 also indicated that "from Salt Creek southward, the area of the South-East is equal to 7,600 square miles [approximately 2 million hectares, of which about 640,000 hectares comprises the Upper South East program area] and in every wet season half of that is under water" (GW Goyder quoted in Turner and Carter (1989)). Furthermore, a study of sediments in watercourses by Barr and Gell (2002) indicated that periods of high salinity had existed well before European settlement. Extensive areas of gypsum and limestone sheet at or near the land surface are further indicators that high watertables and dryland salinity have existed in the region for thousands of years.

In 1992, rising watertables were considered not to be the result of changes in the rainfall (which had been above average for several Upper South East centres, particularly during the latter years of the period from 1988-1992), but rather increased recharge to the unconfined aquifer caused by "the clearance of native vegetation, loss of higher water use perennial pastures and the development of non-wetting characteristics of various soils" (MacKenzie and Stadter, (1992) 7MB PDF file). Adopting the inconsistent and selective logic that has characterised the program for years, the current trend of falling watertables throughout the region has been attributed to below average rainfall, but not increased planting of perennial vegetation!

MacKenzie and Stadter claimed that watertables were "rising in a large part of the Upper South East, with the rises in groundwater generally ranging from 0.5 to 1.0 metre every ten years". However, a review of watertable records for the northern, central and southern traverses (refer to MacKenzie and Stadter (1992), figures 8 to 11) does not support this conclusion (latest bore records are contained in the following files:

northern traverse (544kB PDF file),
central traverse (541kB PDF file) and
southern traverse (543kB PDF file).

The fluctuating records arise because of normal seasonal variations in watertables, generally resulting in rises during the high rainfall period (typically May to August), and falls during the drier months. Falls arises because of a net loss of groundwater, mainly due to its roughly westerly flow to a discharge point in the ocean, and due to losses caused by evaporation and evapotranspiration mainly on the inter-dune flats. The steep decline over the past decade in the watertables for bore WRG009 (northern traverse) and WRG023 (central traverse) are associated with the irrigation (Wirrega Irrigation Area).

Updated records for the 24 bores studied show that watertables in 16 are now lower than they were when records began (late 1960s to early 1980s), and two are at similar levels. While six watertables are at levels higher than when records began, one has stabilised at about 12m below the land surface, and three have been falling since the mid 1990s.

In a 1992 survey (4.1MB PDF file) an estimated 250,840 hectares (37% of the region) of land in the Upper South East (total study area 684,320 hectares) was "affected to some degree by salinity", of which between 22,000 and 33,000 hectares was "naturally saline". In the mid 1990s, the "rising watertable trend" was replaced by a definite falling watertable trend. In 1997, a CSIRO study (1.3MB PDF file) reported that 195,240ha of the region was "salt-affected". The report also noted that "the salinity map in the southern part of the [Upper South East] shows that salt-affected land is being considerably over-estimated".

By 2000, dryland salinity estimates were produced for Australia, and the South Australian audit (1.3MB PDF file) estimated that 250,500ha (remarkably close to the 1992 figure) of land in the Upper South East was still "at risk" or "affected" by salinity, but acknowledged that watertables had been "falling throughout southern [South Australia] for the last 2-3 years up until the year 2000". Program staff continue to refer to these figures as land "degraded" by salinity, a word not even used in the 1992 or 2002 reports.

By 2002, less than 8% of Upper South East landholders reported problems with dryland salinity (click here for the report - 90kB PDF file), which contrasts with 37% of the region still being reported by program staff as "degraded" by dryland salinity. In the same report, salinity was rated a land management issue by proportionately fewer Upper South East landholders than for the State as a whole. In fact, a greater number Upper South East landholders rated (in order) weeds, animal pests, soil fertility, water repellent soils, and waterlogging, as more important land management issues than salinity!!

In 2006, the State Government acknowledged that a declining rainfall trend, which has been clearly evident in the South East since the mid 1900s, is projected to continue well into this century. Watertables are falling, and will continue to fall as rainfall declines and lucerne is re-planted on the dune ranges. Indeed, many landholders have already demonstrated an ability to reverse the effects of dryland salinity at a local level by revegetating surrounding slopes and hills with lucerne, and by adapting agricultural practices on the flats.

The Upper South East community's expressions of concern in 1992 were a result of the State Government's dire and grossly flawed predictions on the spread of dryland salinity, its grossly exaggerated predictions on the benefits of deep drainage, and its omission of facts on the costs and undesirable effects of drains.

The Upper South East is now in a state of drought stress, which is being severely exacerbated by over-drainage of good quality water, and agriculture and the environment (in particular the wetlands) are suffering. The Upper South East community has been expressing its concerns since the mid 1990s on the direction of the program, but program staff and the majority of the State's parliamentarians are not interested.

Selective application of science and analysis

In 1994, the Natural Resources Council, which had responsibility for developing the Upper South East Dryland Salinity and Flood Management Plan, recommended that before constructing the full drainage scheme (then a proposed 270km network comprising drains 1-4m deep), an initial stage should be implemented as a trial, which should be monitored closely (click here (1.5MB PDF file) to read the original recommendations). The Management Plan was also the draft environmental impact statement for the program.

The recommendation for a trial was repeated in a 1995 Assessment Report (6.9MB PDF file) on the Management Plan, which together with the draft environmental impact statement formed the program's "officially recognised environmental impact statement". The Assessment Report also directed that "surface water drainage should generally be considered in preference to groundwater drainage", and also referred to the need to evaluate “the adverse impacts and successes of drainage works”.

Watertables continued or commenced their current falling trend in the mid 1990s, and in the late 1990s, the trial drain removed less than 20% of the groundwater volumes predicted. Despite major differences between what had been predicted in the early 1990s and what was actually happening on the ground, the network's viability has never been thoroughly re-evaluated.

On this flawed basis, the State's Public Works Committee approved the construction of more drains in 1999, without any reference to how the trial results impacted on the effectiveness of the program. In 2003, the Public Works Committee approved a further increase in the network's length to 655km of drains, nearly 400km more than originally proposed!

It is evident from the Committee's final report (2.3MB PDF file) in 2003 that members were misled on the effectiveness of drains, and on the program's viability (the figure of 1.38 quoted in the Committee's report was "not realistic" according to the source document (2MB PDF file)).

Telfer et al (2002) analysed the effectiveness of a 20km trial section of the 52km Fairview deep drain constructed in 1998. Telfer reported that lowering of watertables in a line aligned at right angles to a 3 metre section of drain was symmetrical (click here (1.2MB PDF file) for current records), although a general falling trend in watertables clearly visible prior to the drain's construction prevented a direct measurement of any drain effect. Records for bores WLM066 (600m west) and WLM067 (100m west) show less obvious falling trends - indeed, WLM067 appears to show a recent rising trend, with watertables similar to those prior to drain construction.

Subsequently, unpublished work by Durkay adjacent to the 3 metre section of drain indicates that groundwater levels in April 2004 were lower by an average of about 0.66m (but still showing some asymmetry) at distances from 15m to about 400m from the drain when compared with levels immediately prior to drain construction.

Even though levels were close to their lowest point (just prior to winter rains) they were still similar to or above the level at which groundwater rise to the surface through capillary action could still cause dryland salinity. Land with groundwater 2m or less from the land surface was defined in the 2000/2001 national salinity audit as at risk of salinisation!

Durkay drew attention to the steep incline in groundwater levels either side of the drain. The drainage effect of about 0.66m appears relatively constant to about 400m, then converges to very close to pre-drained levels at distances beyond 1km from the drain. Falls in groundwater levels from Oct 2004 to Feb 2005 were about 0.5m, at 15m from the drain, and 0.8m at 1km.

Telfer also reported that watertable lowering was asymmetric about the 2 metre section of drain, with most occurring to the east (click here (700kB PDF file) for current records). He also noted that watertables were falling both before and after drain construction, and that the "simpler explanation [of the falling trend] is that it is a local trend uninfluenced by the drain".

Telfer estimated the effect of the Fairview trial drain in removing groundwater as "2.4GL/year, but may be larger". This equates to an average of about 0.33ML/drain-km/day. The estimate was derived from an analysis of changes to watertable levels in the region prior to and after drain construction. The drain's discharge volume in the year ending June 2000 was 3.45GL (0.47ML/drain-km/day), or about 50% larger than the "drain effect". The difference between the two values was accounted for with the explanation that "the drains should also intercept a proportion of flux that would previously [have] gone to evapotranspirative discharge and lateral groundwater flux out of the region".

Annual groundwater removal of about 3GL equates to lowering watertables by an average of 0.5m (assuming reasonably well structured soils with 30% porosity) to 500m either side of the 20km section of trial drain. Use of a lower porosity figure results in estimates of watertable lowering and/or lateral distance of drain effect increasing for the same drain flows.

However, lower soil porosity is associated with poorer soil structure, greater capillary rise distances, and hence higher surface evaporation causing dryland salinity from lower watertables. Capillary rise distances from poorly structured soils can be more than 5m, and as little as a few centimetres for well structured soils (Durkay, 2004). Low infiltration associated with poorly structured soils (eg drained sodic soils, in particular clays) prevents effective flushing of salt by rainfall. The risk of land remaining or becoming saline and waterlogged for prolonged periods can increase as a result of deep drainage, because of a breakdown in soil structure!

The program's draft environmental impact statement (part C) estimated average drain flows of about 2.7ML/drain-km/day (Table 10.4, page 138) for a 3m deep drain in terrain similar to that in the region of the Fairview drain, ie groundwater removal in the trial drain was 80-90% less than predicted.

Telfer was critical of the simple model used to predict drain performance (Armstrong and Stadter, 1992), noting that the "model results are unlikely to be adequate for conceptualising and quantifying the behaviour of the systems being tested at the individual flat scale. Sensitivity analysis of drain behaviour with a more representative hydrogeological conceptual model should be undertaken." The 1992 modelling underpinned the program's 1993 benefit-cost analysis, which was hastily updated in 2002 after Telfer's report was released. However, revised hydrogeological modelling to support the 2002 benefit-cost analysis was not undertaken!

Two reports (Howieson (2003) on the Northern Outlet drain, Fitzpatrick et al (2004) on the Ballater East drain) generally noted that groundwater/sub-soil salinity is higher close to deep drains. Also, current records (see above links) show no significant change to groundwater salinity close to the Fairview drain. This is possibly the result of fresher surface water flowing laterally above less permeable sub-soils to the drains during periods of high rainfall, leaving saline groundwater in place below the watertable. A parliamentarian (Hon Andrew Evans, Family First) in the debate on the Act's extension bill was impressed by the 250 tonnes of salt reported to be removed annually by the Fairview drain (total claimed length 54km). This amount of salt falls in rain within 250m of the drain every year, so the figure is distinctly unimpressive.

The Government claims that "250,000 tonnes of salt is being exported from the region each year". According to Everingham et al (2007), total Upper South East drain flows into the Coorong in the period 2000 to 2006 amounted to about 50GL, or 8.35GL annually (and 20% of the estimate in the State Government's NAP Priority Project Proposal (DWLBC, 2002)). Assuming a salinity of 15,000mg/L, annual salt export by the Upper South East drains amounts to a little under 125,000 tonnes. This is about 50% less than the salt that falls on the region annually in rainfall, and flows into the region in surface and groundwater flows!

Using data from another official and probably more reliable source, an average of 110,000 tonnes/year of salt was removed from the region in surface flows in calendar years 2005 and 2006, of which an average 99,500 tonnes/year flowed into the Coorong!

The 1,000ha central (model) farm referred to in Table three (page 9) of the Committee's final report was a special case, was probably unrepresentative of most (if not all) central catchment farms, and was definitely unrepresentative of all northern catchment farms. Indeed, the author of the original analysis (3.7MB PDF file) claimed that the investment required for the pasture renovation program used for calculating the figures "barely breaks even on financing costs with little or no additional remuneration to the farm business owners", so is unlikely to be adopted by any farmer.

In 2002 and subsequently, several background papers, four position papers, and a number of review reports have been produced by State and Commonwealth agencies on the program. Few have little positive to report on the program, and they raise questions on its direction. And have not been made available to the public, for reasons that will become obvious when they are read! Contact the webmaster for locations of copies of these reports.

By 2001, evidence was growing that the nationally-accepted rising groundwater model of dryland salinity was seriously flawed. The model postulated that expansions of the area of dryland salinity in Australia were associated with increased groundwater recharge caused by the removal or loss of deep-rooted perennial vegetation from higher ground. However, numerous observations in catchments in Western Australia, New South Wales, and Victoria (eg reported by Wagner (2001)) were showing that dryland salinity was more closely correlated to soil health, vegetation cover, and to rainfall fluctuations. Furthermore, landholders (including in the Upper South East) demonstrated that dryland salinity could be controlled and reversed at the local level, sometimes within a relatively short time, and that land use and management of susceptible sites was a major factor in initiating dryland salinity.

State Government conclusions in the early 1990s that dryland salinity in the Upper South East was a growing problem that could only be effectively controlled with a regional deep drain network probably inhibited many landholders from adapting their land management practices to control it or mitigate its effects. This explains why many landholders who ignored the State Government's dire predictions have successfully controlled and reversed dryland salinity on their properties, while landholders who took no effective action are still experiencing problems. The State Government's 1992 dire predictions became self-fulfilling for the landholders who believed them!

In 2006, a report (2.6MB PDF file) produced for the Commonwealth Government acknowledged that the 2000 audit over-stated saline areas, in some cases by more than 3-fold, because of the methodologies used. National salinity experts also conceded in 2006 that the publication of the 2000 estimates had been politically motivated, in an apparent attempt to create alarm over the salinity threat in Australia, and to initiate major government responses.

Recently published State and Commonwealth government reports also stated that the Program:

has a poor science base,
has high reliance on drains unlike salinity projects in other states,
has failed to convince that benefits outweighed environmental and economic costs,
may be changing the natural environment and negatively affecting wetlands, and
was not addressing landholder concerns.

These observations are consistent with those of Upper South East landholders, which is a reason why community resolve to fight this divisive and damaging Program is strengthening. This was demonstrated in late 2006 in a demonstration on the steps of the State's Parliament House, and by the tabling of a petition containing 800 signatures urging the State Government not to proceed with the construction of just one of network's drains.

The need to maintain an atmosphere of crisis over the threat from salinity is demonstrated in an article produced for Natural Heritage - The Journal of the Natural Heritage Trust (page 8 of 1.5MB PDF file). In the article, the author claimed that annual production losses of an estimated $436million were arising from salinity in the Upper South East. This compares with the estimated $9.8million in 1993 (click here to see report, 3.7MB PDF file), and $44.4million for the whole of South Australia reported in the 2000 audit. A figure twice the 1993 figure could be explained by inflation, but 45 times larger can only be explained by imagination!

In 2003, a consultant hydrologist wrote to the program expressing his reservations on the basis for the design of the Northern Catchment drains. The drains were constructed in mid 2004 (with no change to designs), and landholders have now been advised that they were over-specified by a factor of up to 10X, possibly more. Wind and water erosion, and weed infestation, together with the toxic chemical mix forming in the drains, have become major problems. Two years after their construction, no discernible difference has been detected in watertables 500m from one deep drain, despite Program staff advising that they would be lowered up to 1.5km away.

What is motivating program staff?

So why have program staff persisted with incorrect claims on the dryland salinity threat, on the benefits of drains, and insisted on enabling legislation to support the Program, when legislation already existed? Clues are found in a number of published and internal documents.

Firstly, in 2002, the program signed up to resource condition targets (pages 117 and 118 of 950kB PDF file) as a condition of receiving $48.3million of tax-payer and landholder money for the Program's current stage. It appears that avoidance of embarrassment caused by acknowledging that the dryland salinity targets had been met before the program's current stage of work commenced (without any new drains being constructed), was given higher priority than properly understanding the unknown economic and environmental consequences of proceeding with the construction of another 400km of deep drains!

Secondly, in an options paper submitted to the responsible Minister in late 2005, a negative impact of not proceeding with the construction of a deep drain was that "some landholders have been expecting a drain for 12 years and not providing one may have adverse political impacts". The facts that watertables in the area in which the proposed drain (Didicoolum drain) was to be constructed are now similar to or lower than they were 30 years ago, with at least one landholder still reporting increasing dryland salinity on his property, and neighbours reporting little or no effects, seems to have escaped the notice or interest of program staff. Appeasing some landholders by carrying through a 12 year old promise attracted higher priority than understanding why some landholders have successfully minimised the impact of dryland salinity without drains, and why others have not.

Program staff also dismissed a number of specialist reports that advised against constructing the Didicoolum drain because "it was concluded there was inadequate assessment made of of the observations and trends in water tables and the consequent dryland salinity risks that have previously been well documented in the [Upper South East]". The clear inference was that watertables were still rising and dryland salinity still expanding in the region. The Minister approved the Program's preferred option.

The program's construction manager conceded that performance modelling to support the design of the Didicoolum drain was expected to be wrong, because of known errors in the parameters used. The erroneous parameters previously resulted in drain performance being over-estimated by more than five times, and arose because aquifer transmissivity had been measured in the autumn of 1992, when watertables were below the base level of drains proposed for construction.

A third reason expressed in a recent Environment, Resources and Development Committee report and in debates on the Act's extension bill was concern that Commonwealth funding for the program might have to be repaid if drains are not constructed!! That is, the Act's extension was needed to ensure that all tax-payers' money provided to the State Government was spent on drain construction in the Upper South East before it is withdrawn, regardless of whether or not drains are needed. Viewers of the television series "Yes Minister" will be familiar with this bureaucratic logic.

And finally a fourth reason. Is it possible that the State Government still feels unable to control the recalcitrant landholder cited by the Minister in 2002 as the reason for the original Act?

Effective management of dryland salinity

The officially recognised Environmental Impact Statement directed that "surface water drainage should generally be considered in preference to groundwater drainage", which would have controlled waterlogging of agricultural land and preserved water quality for wetlands. This option was supported by studies conducted by expert advisers to the program in 1993 and 1994.

The Environmental Impact Statement also provided "a regional target of 55% cover with perennial agricultural vegetation and 20% cover with native vegetation should be achieved by 2005", which would have addressed the claimed root cause of rising watertables, provided a productive management option for landholders, and eliminated any need for deep drains!

These options would have been supported by the majority of landholders, and were determined in 1993 to be the most cost-effective solution for dryland salinity and flooding in the region. A shallow surface water drainage scheme would have been considerably less expensive to construct, and maintain in the long-term, and less intrusive and damaging to the environment.

Experts generally acknowledge that a regional target of 40 - 50% perennial vegetation cover is needed to control groundwater recharge. Indeed, extensive re-planting of perennial vegetation in the region over the past decade is probably contributing to falling watertables.

A recent (unpublished but copy made available to the NRC) CSIRO position paper noted that the adverse effects of salinity have been brought about by a change of water balance on the dunes (ie loss of deep-rooted perennial vegetation resulting in increased groundwater recharge on the dunes and consequent saline discharge on the flats), and concluded that 90% of dunes and associated areas would need to be covered by low recharge land use, such as lucerne. The report also identified other studies that indicated that 50% recharge reduction would be sufficient to reduce land salinisation.

A review for the program (click here for a copy, 3.3MB PDF file) reported that about 37% of the Upper South East had elevations higher than 2m above surrounding flats (which is presumed to include all land identified as "dune and associated areas"). Thus, between 19% (50% of the dune area) and 33% (90% of the dune area) of the Upper South East would need to be covered with deep-rooted perennial vegetation in order to control dryland salinity.

The CSIRO position paper went on to conclude that it may take some time for threshold levels for recharge control to be attained, and during this initial period the use of engineering (drains) to protect valuable land may be considered. Vegetating the dunes with deep-rooted lucerne would have cost less than constructing the deep drain network, been immediately and highly productive, and in the long-term would have cost considerably less to maintain. This option was not evaluated in any of the benefit-cost studies conducted for the program.

Somehow, the CSIRO conclusion was turned by program staff into a requirement for 80-90% of all of the Upper South East to be covered with deep-rooted vegetation or pasture to restore the groundwater balance, which was considered to be an unattainable target ... and the case for deep drains was again justified. This latter statement (repeated by Minister Gago in the Legislative Council debate on 1 November 2006 on the Act's extension bill) also became a justification for an extension of the program. A revegetation target of between 19% to 33% is definitely attainable (if not already attained)!

CSIRO advice to the program in 2002 and 2003 that replacing 70,000ha (10% of the region) of annual pastures with perennial vegetation, predicted flows from the proposed drainage network into the Coorong would fall by a third (a reduction of 20,000,000,000 Litres or 20 GL!). This demonstrates the potential impact that the right vegetation in the right place can have on groundwater recharge.

It continues to make more sense to increase use of rainfall in the region, which commenced a declining trendin the higher rainfall areas the mid 1900s (see the history webpage and scroll down to the graphs), by using it more efficiently for agriculture and preserving its quality for wetlands. Deep drains should never have formed the central solution for dryland salinity and flooding in the region.

More mismanaged salinity projects

Mismanagement and contradictionscharacterise salinity and drainage projects throughout Australia, some of which have attracted more serious allegations. A common theme of some is action motivated more by the ready availability of public money and tax breaks, than by a need to implement cost-effective, long-term, environmental solutions. Examples include:

Planting wrong trees in wrong places, which has reduced surface water runoff and caused salinity to increase in streams, watercourses, wetlands, and rivers. Blue Gum plantations in the Lower South East have had a major impact on watertables and runoff, and are believed to be a cause of Drain M's (described below) reduced flows.
Inappropriate use of deep drains to lower watertables, which has led to:
- Acid sulfate soils; drainage of wetlands; and contamination of drain water and wetlands with acid water, heavy metals and salts. CSIRO recently reported (1.6MB PDF file) initial evidence of these contaminants in the 6-year old, 53 km long Tilley Swamp drain, which is a link in a proposed connector between the higher rainfall Lower South East and the Coorong.
- A break-down in soil structure (sodicity), leading to infertile soils, hard pans, increased waterlogging, wind and water erosion. These adverse effects are being reported in the Upper South East. Program staff are just re-discovering the causes, effects and remediation of sodic soils, 50 years after they were first researched and reported in Western Australia. Current Program advice to delay treatment of potential sodic soils until after drainage is irresponsible, and contrary to international and CSIRO advice (2.3MB PDF file, page ii).

See Jennifer Marohasy's salinity archive to read more on other Australian projects, or go back to the index to read more on the Upper South East.

Another disaster in the making?

The sick shore-line of Lake George in South Australia's Lower South East provides a highly visible example of an unexpected consequence of drains on the environment.

The once crystal clear and pristine wildlife habitat was nearly dead, some believe because of discharge into the lake of large volumes of nutrient-rich water from Drain M of the Lower South East's drainage network in the period up to 2000, while others believe the cause was reduced flows since 2000!

Articles on the lake can be found on the media reports webpage, where you will find other theories for the lake's past poor health. Make up your own mind on the cause ... if you can.

And to make matters worse, staff of the Upper South East Dryland Salinity and Flood Management Program now propose to divert Drain M's and Drain E's water north to "freshen" the over-drained wetlands of the Upper South East, including the internationally-recognised, Ramsar-listed Coorong! This latest decision is in stark contrast to a Commonwealth Government requirement of 2003, based on "expert" advice, that drainage flows into the Coorong should be minimised to maintain its hyper-saline state, in accordance with obligations contained in the Ramsar agreement.

Some believe that Lake George's health will only recover when its polluted waters are flushed by re-opening the lake's artificial outlet to the sea. Presumably, the Program has a similar contingency plan for the Coorong's South Lagoon when it suffers the same fate in the future.

Drain M's annual flows have declined from an average of more than 60 GL up until about 15 years ago, to a current average of less than 30 GL (Heneker, 2007), with only 5 GL reported in 2005, and less than 2 GL in the year ending mid 2006. Major causes of the decreased flows are a drying climate trend and the establishment of plantation forestry (blue gum and pine) in the region, both of which lead to reduced surface water runoff! Rainfall trends published on the Bureau of Meteorology's website shows that annual rainfall in the region has fallen by 20mm to more than 30mm a decade since 1970, or about 5%/decade.

Drain M is claimed by the State Government to carry "most of the rainwater in the state's South-East" (media briefing to The Advertiser, February 2, 2007, page 5), so it is difficult to understand where the "20-50GL" to be diverted north through the Upper South East to restore its wetlands will come from. Add to this the requirements of the region's 40,000 hectares of wetlands of at least 200GL/year, and the project appears to have failed before it even started.

Estimates of the water surface area of the Coorong average about 175 km², which means that the annual loss of water to the atmosphere (evaporation minus rainfall) will be around 175 GL. That is, annual water flows into the Coorong will need to equal at least 175 GL just to keep pace with evaporation. The figure is consistent with the estimated (3.5MB PDF file, §2.3) South Lagoon summer to winter volume change of 90GL.

Potential sources of water include direct rainfall (approximately 70GL), from the River Murray (currently zero), from the sea via the constricted mouth of the River Murray, seepage from groundwater and from the ocean, and discharge from the Upper South East drainage network. Annual discharge from the drainage network has averaged 8.35GL since 2000, with an average salinity of about 15,000 mg/L.

The water being discharged by the drainage network is not of the correct salinity to maintain the Coorong's hyper-saline state in accordance with the Ramsar agreement. The Coorong is now close to 25% pure salt in the South Lagoon, and despite a good waterbird breeding season, is reported to be in its final death throes. However, the environmental and economic risks and economic costs of diverting the declining flows of Drain M and E probably far outweigh the negligible benefits that a few additional gigalitres a year will provide. This is even before considering the likely damaging effects of fresh water flowing down drains that have sodic collapsing banks and toxic chemical mixes in their bases.

The proposal to divert Lower South East water north to revitalise the Upper South East's wetlands, like the case for the Upper South East program, attracts many environmental risks. However, many landholders hope that lessons have been learned from the Upper South East program, and that the environmental impact assessment process to support the floodways project will be thorough, and recommendations adhered to.

Landholders also hope that a decision to use the construction of floodways as justification to construct deep drains on adjacent land, as has apparently been promised by program staff, will be subjected to rigorous review. The floodways assessment will provide an ideal opportunity to revisit the flawed environmental impact assessment for the Upper South East program. Circumstances now in the Upper South East are considerably different to those predicted in the early 1990s, and many lessons have been learned over the past decade about the damage caused by deep drains.

For tens of thousands of years, the Upper South East adapted naturally to the 100,000 tonnes of salt a year that fell on the Program area in rainfall, and the 500,000 tonnes brought into the region in surface and groundwater water flows from across the State's border with Victoria and from the Lower South East. It is only since Europeans started to apply insensitive and inappropriate land and water management practices to the normally resilient landscape and wetlands that the environmental problems have occurred.

After years of disastrous, inconsistent and contradictory decision-making, based on flawed predictions arising from the poor application of science, is there any reason why taxpayers and Upper South East landholders should believe that Program staff are now implementing the most effective solution for the region's environmental problems?

One thing can be predicted accurately though. After turning the region into an environmental disaster area with what they once boasted was "Australia's largest infrastructure experiment", the city bureaucrats responsible for the Program will retire to their Adelaide homes, while generations of Upper South East landholders 300km away will be left to clear up the mess they created.

Click here to go to previous news and stories webpage.

Money Down
The Drain

Site menu:

Previously published home page news and stories

A contrived program

Absence of rigorous oversight

The great drain robbery!

Many contradictions!

Off the rails

Politics of drains

Brief history of the program

Conflicting science

The Upper South East Act

A public relation's disaster

The Upper South East

Post European settlement

Challenging the claims on dryland salinity and deep drains

Exaggerated threats

Selective application of science and analysis

What is motivating program staff?

Effective management of dryland salinity

More mismanaged salinity projects

Another disaster in the making?

Money Down The Drain

Site menu:

Previously published home page news and stories

A contrived program

Absence of rigorous oversight

The great drain robbery!

Many contradictions!

Off the rails

Politics of drains

Brief history of the program

Conflicting science

The Upper South East Act

A public relation's disaster

The Upper South East

Post European settlement

Challenging the claims on dryland salinity and deep drains

Exaggerated threats

Selective application of science and analysis

What is motivating program staff?

Effective management of dryland salinity

More mismanaged salinity projects

Another disaster in the making?

Money Down
The Drain