This kangaroo died a few metres from a fauna ramp in water drained from acid sulfate soils that had ponded behind one of many blockages of wind-blown and water eroded sand. It was either poisoned or got stuck and drowned in stinking, deep, sticky monosulfidic black ooze sediment. Departmental advice on the risks of disturbing and draining acid-sulfate soils appears to have been ignored. The photographs are of a 5 metre deep section of a six-year old groundwater drain in South Australia's Upper South East - the gate used to be across a 4 metre wide track at the top of a drain bank. The SA State Government mandated a $100 million tax-payer and landholder funded 650km saline groundwater drain network for the region in 2002 despite departmental advice that a smaller percentage of regional landholders than in the state as a whole rated dryland salinity a problem, that the program was probably uneconomic, and that groundwater drains were 83% less effective than predicted.
Local landholder warnings of the potential for major wind erosion were also ignored, with the responsible government engineer deciding that natural revegetation was all that was needed to stabilise sandy drain banks. The result is seen above - one of many similar sections of wind blown and water eroded sand blocking barely existent drain flows, even though this section had been excavated and the bank repaired a year after its construction! Nearly 60km of drain lies up-stream, and beyond that lies the Tatiara Creek and its catchment. The State Government claimed that the drains only need desilting once every 20 years!
Click here to view the above location in Google Maps and here for the other 40 or so areas of major wind and water erosion in the Northern Catchment viewed at the same scale.

Latest news:


5th June 2010

Coorong pumping

Mitch Williams, our local State MP and the Liberal's water security spokesperson, was heard today on ABC radio criticising a government plan to pump hyper-saline water out of the Coorong's south lagoon, claiming that all that was needed was to freshen it with water diverted from the South East's deep drain network.

As he well knows, his proposal has been in the planning and development stage for over 20 years, but the experts in the State's DWLBC, supported by both major political parties, again got their predictions hopelessly wrong with, according to CSIRO, the mandated 650km, $200 million drain network only yielding "small volumes" (6.4MB PDF).


18th March 2010

Lose times five

The perception managers of SA's Department of Whoppers (DWLBC), as it is known by local landholders, appears to have been active again fabricating more spin on its bungled Upper South East drainage program in time for recent debates on the program's extension bill.

Contrary to the DWLBC's hidden website (inaccessible to search engines and apparently produced for gullible politicians and impressionable but uninformed, selected public), the program is lose-lose-lose-lose-lose for agriculture, the environment, tax-payers, levy-slugged landholders, and for the credibility of the State Government.

Unlike in 2002 and 2006, Labor MPs, presumably unwilling to mislead parliament again, had nothing of substance to say in debates on the program's extension bill, not even in defence of detailed criticism. They left spruiking to (conveniently?) misinformed Liberal MPs (Williams, Pederick, Lensinck, Schaeffer and Gunn) following what appears to have been a two-party agreement to support the bill made in about June 2009.

A grossly misinformed Lensinck ignorant of the facts claimed in the Legislative Council debate that the 2 to 6 metre deep, eroding, stinking drains "adjacent to Keith" were "shallow flood control drains". Similar to Schaeffer, Pederick, and implied by Gunn, she also incorrectly claimed that the NRC made an "overwhelming recommendation ... to continue to complete the drains". Nice try, but absolute rubbish!

Even Williams pointed out that the dry landscape in the Upper South East was different to where he lives, where agriculture benefited from drains. So why selectively support the same deep drain solution when DWLBC experts warned against their use in Upper South East soils?

Echoing the disinterested sentiment evident in Minister Wetherill's press release (65kB PDF file), the MPs obviously only supported continued digging of deep drains because of their inexpert gut feeling and government promises made to a few of the 700+ landholders in the region, and not because science or economics justified their need. Not even the NRC report they quoted from recommended digging any more of these ineffective, high maintenance conduits (word used by the program's hydrologist Michael Durkay in 2004)!

Independent scientists only given the task of looking at the risks of different drain options reported (5.0MB PDF) last year that if nothing was done, wetlands' health would continue to deteriorate, and of the drain options highest risks were associated with deep drains. They were not given the task of ...

... more


18th November 2009

Draining experience


13th July 2009

Government again mangles science?


25th May 2009

Stock Journal battle


More stories.


More landholder views on the Upper South East program are on the "Stop the Drains" website.


Snapshots of a man-made environmental disaster:

What's missing from this Upper South East deep drain?


photo of deep dry drain

Water! The South Australian Government claimed "science" proved a drain was needed here to remove saline groundwater and flood water.

In 2002, proportionally fewer landholders in the Upper South East than for the State as a whole rated dryland salinity a land management issue!



cattle grazing lucerne

Land incorrectly classified as saline by the State Government, and incapable of growing lucerne, but here with lucerne, and without drains!

In 2005, salinity assessments were acknowledged in a Commonwealth Government report to have been grossly exaggerated.



wetlands salinized by deep drains

Wetlands destroyed by saline groundwater from deep drains.

The Government's preferred solution to a problem that occurred over 15 years ago is to lower watertables with environmentally damaging and expensive deep drains, rather than understand, and then treat, the causes of dryland salinity.

Watertables in the region have been falling naturally for 15 years, but nobody in the State Government has tried to understand why some landholders are claiming that dryland salinity is still expanding, or why landholders on adjacent properties are able to grow healthy crops and pastures that are supposed to be incapable of growing in such conditions.



wetlands salinized by deep drains

This 250m wide, 16km long monstrosity was dug through a range without approval, and involved the destruction of nearly 200 hectares of protected native vegetation.

It was dug to provide an exit to the Coorong for drainage flows from the north of the region, even though a natural discharge route existed a few kilometres to the north.

And guess what? The Government rolled over and ended up paying for its construction!


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Welcome

Welcome to this landholder-run website on South Australia's Upper South East Dryland Salinity and Flood Management Program.

Our main objective is to provide regional landholders with information (without government spin) on the causes, effects and management of dryland salinity. However, other visitors from the state and from outside the region, including from more than 60 countries since early 2007, will also discover lessons learned on how not to repair environmental damage using inappropriate, unverified, but government-mandated, land management practices!

After this home page, the Detrimental Effects, References, and Media webpages are the most popular, and the most popular down-loads are historical summaries of watertable records, especially those associated with the region's trial Fairview Drain. These files can be accessed by clicking here and scrolling down to the paragraphs on regional watertables, and to later paragraphs on the Fairview Drain.

Background

The program was conceived in the early 1990s, when dryland salinity and flooding in the region were predicted to grow as a result of rising watertables. Although the region always had naturally high watertables, wide-scale government-legislated clearance of native vegetation, uncoordinated digging of deep drains to relieve flooding, followed by a period of above average rainfall, led to a reported increase in dryland salinity and flooding.

The State Government committed to addressing these problems, and in the mid 1990s a 270km network of deep drains to remove excess groundwater and surface water became the dominant component in a proposed integrated program to protect and improve the region's agricultural productivity and environmental health. However, project approval was subject to the successful completion of a deep drain trial, to a thorough evaluation of the program's underlying science, and to a condition that preference should be given to digging cheaper and less environmentally damaging surface drains.

Deep drains attract high capital, maintenance and operating costs, and have adverse effects on soils, wetlands and native vegetation. Deep drains also address a symptom of past inappropriate land management practices, and not the root causes of dryland salinity. Other potential remedies for dryland salinity include improving soil structure and vegetation cover on susceptible land, and re-planting deep-rooted perennial vegetation on high ground to prevent excess groundwater recharge, which would otherwise cause deep-lying saline groundwater to be forced up closer to the land surface in low lying areas. These land management approaches differ markedly from deep drains - they are environmentally sustainable, and are directly associated with generating income.

However, the early 1990s' predictions of rising watertables turned out to be completely wrong (watertables commenced their current falling trend in the mid-1990s), and groundwater removal in the deep drain trial in the late 1990s was found to be considerably less than predicted.

In 2002, official State Government documents (none released formally to the public) reported that:

Also in 2002, and dismissing advice to the contrary, the State Government proposed (and then mandated in enabling legislation) an increase in the network's size to 650km of deep drains. The total program cost blew out threefold to an estimated $75million. Realistic operating and maintenance costs for the program are now an estimated $4-8 million a year - current budget estimates still remain at one-tenth of this figure.

In late 2006, an extension to the 2002 enabling legislation was justified by the responsible Minister in the State's Parliament using a gross misinterpretation, and obvious misunderstanding, of advice provided by CSIRO scientists! Then, in early 2007, the State Government announced a $14million expansion to the network, by adding even more drains and floodways, but this time to divert up to 50 gigalitres of water into the region from the south to freshen its now over-drained and poisoned wetlands.

Needless to say, State Government claims on the volume of fresh water available for diversion have been grossly exaggerated. Historically, before climate change seriously impacted on the region, official records show that 157 gigalitres of water was discharged annually into the sea from the Blackford Drain, and Drains L and M. However, such flows have not been experienced for nearly 15 years, and recent records now show discharge volumes average only about one-tenth of the earlier flows!

Incorrect 15-year old predictions on watertable trends and on drain performance continue to inform decision-making, without the State Government making any serious attempt to validate their accuracy. There is also a growing body of evidence that information provided by scientists to program officials has been misinterpreted, selectively reported, or exaggerated, with the result that support for the program from parliamentarians, landholders, and the public, has been inappropriately sustained.

Testimonials from a few farmers who believe they have benefited from deep drains remain the State Government's primary means of demonstrating that the network is achieving positive results. Whole-of-life benefits and costs have rarely, if ever, been objectively quantified. In particular, short- and long-term economic and environmental costs, and the contribution of naturally falling watertables and other factors, have not been reported publicly. Examples of landholders who have successfully turned saline land into productive land without deep drains also go unreported. Click here (1.2MB PDF file) and here (1.7MB PDF file, page 6) for two of these inconvenient stories.

Reinforcing increasing calls for a long overdue (and apparently required annually by Commonwealth Government legislation) independent inquiry into the program are claims of enormous volumes of greenhouse gases now being emitted as a direct consequence of the drain network. A net increase of an estimated one million tonnes a year of carbon dioxide equivalent gases has been attributed to chemical reactions in newly drained soils, and to changed agricultural practices. This is ten times more than the salt removed by the drain network (100,000 tonnes anually, not the 250,000 tonnes reported by Government officials), which is not even keeping up with the 250,000 tonnes of salt that falls naturally in rain on the Upper South East catchment each year. The drain network is thus more efficient at producing greenhouse gases than it is removing saline groundwater!

Before the introduction of European farming practices, which included extensive drain digging and clearance of native vegetation from the region, salt was continuously discharged naturally to the sea:

Recently reported proposals to develop a huge brown coal deposit (the most prolific producer of carbon dioxide of all fossil fuels) in the south of the Upper South East, which will feed a proposed 300 Megawatt power station, will add even more greenhouse gas emissions to the total, and undoubtedly bring about the final death of the region's last remaining pristine wetlands, including the Coorong. Go to the media reports webpage to read more.

This website

This website provides several examples of misinterpreted or apparently misrepresented science and analysis being inappropriately used to gain and sustain support for the dominant drain component of the Upper South East program.

Information has been provided by, or derived from, several sources, in particular:

If you would like to make an inquiry, contribute to this website, or advise of or suggest corrections, then please contact the webmaster at the address below.

This update published 7th June 2010
First published 24th January 2005

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