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This update published 27th March 2008
First published 24th January 2005

This page is being updated. Please call back later to read the final version.

A brief history of Upper South East drains

Introduction

1992 - 1995

1996 - 2001

2002 - 2004

Rural Solutions Economic Review of Program

Other Events

Past 2005 to now

Recent research reports

Didicoolum Drain Extension

REM report - New

Ministerial Submission - New

CSIRO Position Papers

Changes in groundwater balance - Updated

Groundwater and salinity trends

Salinity, sodicity and high pH in drained soils

Sulfidic materials in drains

SA Parliament Environment Resources and Development Committee

Senate Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts References Committee

Review for Natural Heritage Trust and National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality

Introduction

The Upper South East is situated approximately 300km south-east of Adelaide, measures about 100km from south to north, and extends about 100km inland from the coast in the west. The region is divided into a series of flats separated by well-defined ranges that run parallel to the coast, but which are less well-defined in the north. The ranges were formed several thousand years ago when the sea retreated westwards to the current coast-line. The region is situated over an extensive shallow, unconfined groundwater system (typically about 20m to 30m thick) that has its eastern boundary across the state border in Victoria.

The South East of South Australia has experienced large-scale flooding and dryland salinity for thousands of years, and has been described as once being the "Kakadu of the South until a huge network of drains was carved through the region to improve arability of the land and ease of movement" (ABC (2006)). Descriptions of the region in the early 1800s (reported in Carter et al (1989) and England R (1993)) indicate that up to half of the land was seasonally flooded, with many areas being permanently inundated. Prior to European settlement, the South East was dominated by wetlands, of which only about 8% remain (Gell et al (2002)).

Groundwater in the upper, unconfined aquifer flows slowly in a general westerly direction to the coast, whereas surface water is directed north-westwards along the eastern sides of the ranges. The eastern sides of the ranges are where watertables are closest to, or above, the land surface, and where soils are generally less permeable. As the surface water flows slowly to its natural discharge point into the Coorong at Salt Creek, salts became concentrated as water is evaporated.

Salt has always been present in the South East. The area was once under the sea, and salts have been brought into the region in rainfall at an average rate of about 100kg/hectare/year (Walker G (2004)). Less soluble salts precipitated out of solution and became concentrated at the land surface under the influence of high watertables, capillary action, and evaporation. Extensive deposits of these salts, in the form of gypsum, limestone and calcrete, can be found in the north of the region.

Distributions of the more soluble salts (such as sodium chloride, sodium carbonate and sodium bicarbonate) at the land surface vary seasonally, depending mainly upon the depth to the watertable, rainfall, temperature, vegetation cover, and soil structure. Water with dissolved salts from deeper watertables is drawn up to the land surface by capillary action, where it evaporates and salts become concentrated. Clay (low permeability) soils have a larger capillary rise distance (can be more than 5m, compared with sands, which have capillary rise distances measured in tens of cm). Clay soils also hold salts more strongly than sandy soils, because rainfall is less effective at leaching them from the poorly porous structure.

Commencing in the mid 1800s, an extensive network of drains with outlets to the sea was constructed in the Lower South East. This opened up previously waterlogged land for agriculture, and reduced the south to north surface water flows through the Upper South East to the Coorong. Salt export from the Upper South East via surface water flows was thus reduced.

While salts have been part of the Upper South East landscape for thousands of years, analysis of sediments in the natural watercourses of the region indicates that since European settlement, there has been a shift from a stable, resilient system to a system of fluctuating salinity which is unable to recover from disturbance. Less resilient wetlands have been attributed to the removal of native vegetation and re-engineered and managed surface water flows (Gell et al (2002)).

Dryland salinity in the Upper South East has been exacerbated by increased groundwater recharge under dunes and ranges, which had been cleared of native vegetation and replaced with grazing pastures. Deep-rooted perennial vegetation intercepts and transpires almost all rainfall, unlike shallow-rooted, annual pastures, which have become a feature of run-down grazing properties in the region.

In the early 1980s, a combination of lucerne aphid, drought, and over-grazing by sheep, resulted in the loss of extensive areas of lucerne (a deep-rooted perennial pasture), which until then had controlled groundwater recharge to values similar to those under native vegetation.

Following floods in the 1980s, community concerns that dryland salinity was increasing resulted in the Upper South East Dryland Salinity and Flood Management Plan being developed for the Natural Resources Council of South Australia in the early 1990s.

1992 - 1995

A salinity map of the Upper South East identified about 223,000ha of land as being salt-affected, with a further 27,000ha being naturally saline land (Cann et al (1992)). The map was derived from assessments of vegetation health (not salinity) observed in aerial photographs, backed up by field inspections. Land classifications were recorded on a scale ranging from not affected by salinity (Category 1) to affected by very high to extreme salinity (Category 5).

A later study noted that some poor vegetation health had been caused by factors other than salinity, eg waterlogging, and poor surface water and land management (Furby et al (1998)). Furby noted that the estimated area affected in 1990 was 60,000ha, but the recorded increase between 1990 and 1992 was "most likely the result of increased awareness and better recognition of the problem, rather than the physical expansion of salinisation", although "some increase would have been attributed to the preceding wet years". The quoted figure of 223,000ha thus represented an upper limit of "European-induced dryland salinity" in 1992.

The Upper South East Dryland Salinity and Flood Management Plan (NRC (1993)), published as a draft Environmental Impact Statement, had a number of objectives, which were to be met by an integrated strategy comprising four components, namely:

The dominant and most contentious component of the Plan was the proposed $36 million, 270km network of deep drains that was deemed necessary for "groundwater level and associated soil salinisation control". However, drains deeper than about 0.5m are more expensive to construct, maintain and operate, and they also have potential to:

A benefit:cost analysis conducted for the Plan (Barber A (1993)) concluded that without drainage agricultural productivity in the Upper South East would decline significantly if watertables continued to rise at the rates predicted by Cann. The study analysed several drainage options, and found that they would generally result in improvements to agricultural productivity when compared with a "do nothing option". The study predicted that stocking rates for a central catchment model farm could increase by 56%, but after considering other costs, including the cost of pasture renovation to achieve the predicted increase, "the investment barely breaks even on financing costs with little or no additional remuneration to the farm business owners"!

The study also estimated benefit:cost ratios (BCRs) for drainage options in the southern, central and northern Upper South East catchments. BCRs ranged from below one to over two, and all were generally less than for the model farm. Surface drainage was shown to be more economic than groundwater drainage, and northern catchment options were the least economic of all evaluated. Environmental benefits and costs of drainage were not included in the study, which later were found to have a major negative influence on the estimated BCRs. Estimated increases in stocking rates for various drain options were calculated, and were generally about 10%.

A study of rainfall records in 1993 would also have shown that the Upper South East's salinity and flooding problems were associated with a peak in an approximately 9-year cyclic pattern of winter rainfall, when most groundwater recharge normally occurs. Furthermore, the study would have shown that the Upper South East has been experiencing a decline in average annual rainfall of up to 20mm per decade since the mid 1900s, a trend which continues today. Click on the diagrams below to see higher resolution versions.

may to august 5 year rainfall averageannual rainfall averages

Finally, a review of the extensive national and international scientific literature available at the time would have shown that drainage of saline or waterlogged land often causes serious, and in some cases irrecoverable, damage to soils and the environment (see for example Quirk et al (1955) and Abrol et al (1988)).

watertable trends

A network of observation wells in the Upper South East was extended in the early 1990s. Extensive and regular monitoring of watertables and groundwater salinity also commenced, and detailed information from all observation wells is available for public review on a dedicated State Government website known as Obswell. Almost all observation wells show that watertables in the region have been falling since the mid-1990s.The following diagram is a summary of watertable data for the period 1990 - 2003 (from Howieson P (2003)). Blue arrows indicate falling trends, red arrows rising trends. The larger the arrow, the more significant the trend.

The Upper South East Dryland Salinity and Flood Management Plan assumed that drainage was necessary to control and reverse what was believed then to be an ongoing and inevitable rise in watertables! However, two independent reviews of the Plan were unconvinced of the arguments for a deep drain network (Semeniuk (1993), Coffey (1994)), which also drew considerable opposition and questioning from landholders and several government agencies (NRC (1994b)). Despite clear opposition and contrary reviews (two-thirds of public and government submissions on the Plan either opposed or expressed concerns with the proposals), the drain proposals remained unchanged, and were re-published by the Natural Resources Council in 1994 in a Supplement to the original draft Environmental Impact Statement (NRC (1994 and 1994c)). However, the Supplement's Executive Summary (NRC (1994c)) also clearly stated that "part of the adopted [drainage] scheme should be implemented as a trial and monitored closely before a full scheme is implemented". Other recommendations appear to have been ignored!

The Supplement and draft Environmental Impact Statement were then reviewed by the State Government's Environmental Impact Assessment Branch, and the findings were presented in an Assessment Report (EIA Branch (1995)). The report identified deficiencies in background information, and stated that "additional geotechnical investigation will need to be undertaken during the survey of designated [drainage] routes". The report stated that major decision making should be directed to surface water drainage in preference to groundwater drainage, and that implementation should involve a four stage process in accordance with a "flexible, dynamic, adaptable, and regularly reviewed" management plan .... which has never been published, probably because it was never produced.

The first stage of implementation was to have included "both groundwater and major surface water trials" in the southern and central catchments, in order to comprehensively analyse "the impacts of the two types of drainage and their effectiveness [in lowering watertables]" and "to allow for the evaluation of the adverse impacts and the successes of drainage works".

The Environmental Impact Assessment Branch report listed the advantages of surface water drainage, and indicated that subsequent stages of drain construction should be influenced by further studies because "there are so many variables yet to be defined and the body of knowledge and relative value of solutions will evolve with investigation and experience". Subjects of interest included saltland agronomy, evaluation of the adverse impacts of drainage, land degradation rates (caused by rising watertables), landowner commitments to on-farm measures, and agricultural productivity and viability.

The Assessment Report, draft Environmental Impact Statement and Supplement then formed the "officially recognised EIS" for the Program. However, Program staff still today when referring to the Environmental Impact Statement appear to be unaware of the existence of the Assessment Report and Supplement.

In June 1995, the South Australian State Cabinet endorsed the staged implementation of the Upper South East Dryland Salinity and Flood Management Plan, including the drainage trial, and "agreed to contribute financially to the $24million drainage component" with the provision that implementation would only proceed if there was "a clear commitment from the local community to contribute 25% [ie $6 million]; and from the Commonwealth Government to contribute 37.5% of the drainage component" (reported in SA State Govt (1999)).

1996 - 2001

In July 1996, the Plan was endorsed by the Commonwealth Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, and the Commonwealth agreed to provide funding from the National Landcare Program for the drainage works associated with the first stage of construction (reported in SA State Govt (1999)).

In December 1996, the State's Public Works Committee (PWC (1996)) recommended to Parliament that the Stage One works of the drainage scheme proceed. The Committee's report noted that "the most significant concern expressed [by the community] related to the underground depth of the drains that are to be installed as part of this proposal, however, these concerns have been addressed", without describing how.

The report claimed that a feature of the very first drain to be dug was to have been "the benefits it will provide for wetland sites in the area"; in practice the drain diverted fresh water out to sea away from some of Australia's most pristine wetlands, including the Coorong! The approved drain (Fairview Drain) was 52km long, had depths varying between 2m and 3.5m (ie a groundwater drain), was constructed in the south of the Upper South East, and was supposed to have been a trial.

The Public Works Committee made no reference to the 1994 Supplement to, or the 1995 Assessment Report on, the 1993 draft Environment Impact Statement (which combined to form the "officially approved Environmental Impact Statement" for the program). Key recommendations of the later documents included:

The Public Works Committee report stated that "the [now 450 km] drainage works are to be constructed in three stages with the estimated cost of design, construction, monitoring and overall project management being $24million". The report also failed to note (presumably as briefed by the Program managers) that a decision to commence subsequent stages of drain construction were subject to the results of monitoring the trial drain's impacts and effectiveness.

On 3 December 1996, the Committee's report was tabled in the House of Assembly, and a motion made that the report be received. The motion was carried and an order then made that the report be printed. This is presumably the date on which Stage One works were officially approved.

A “True Salinity Map” of the Upper South East was produced by CSIRO in 1998 (Furby et al (1998)). The map was derived from the 1992 salinity map, information from a time sequence of four Landsat infrared images, digital terrain data, and field inspections. Vegetation status was noted to be a poor indicator of salinity status, because waterlogging can have similar effects to dryland salinity. The area affected by dryland salinity was recorded to be 195,240ha (22% less than the 250,840ha recorded in 1992), which is consistent with observations of falling watertables in the region (more on this later!).

In 1998, construction of the Stage One trial drain (Fairview) was completed.

In 1999, the Program's Progress Report (SA State Govt (1999)) contradicted the 1998 CSIRO report by stating that "there has been a significant increase in degradation by salinisation in the area over the past decade" and "the current estimate of the area of land affected by salinity is 250,000 ha .... with a further 175,000ha at risk [which is all land classified as Category 2 in the 1992 prediction (Cann et al (1992))]". The Progress Report stated that nearly all recommendations contained in the Environmental Impact Statement Assessment Report had been adopted, which was a condition of Commonwealth financial assistance for the Program. A review six years later shows that many key recommendations received no consideration at all!

The Progress Report stated that the groundwater drawdown of the Fairview drain appeared to extend up to about 2.5 km, but that "relatively low regional groundwater levels [had existed] over the past 3 years as a result of the extended period of below average rainfall years". Furthermore, the Progress Report argued illogically that "a [major surface] drainage trial is not needed to compare the impacts of the two [major surface and groundwater] drainage options on adjacent watertables", apparently in the belief that the impacts and effectiveness of drains can only be measured by changes in watertable levels. That is, well documented adverse impacts of groundwater drainage on soils, wetlands, and native vegetation were ignored. The Program has continued in complete ignorance of the extensive national and international experience of and reporting on the positive and negative effects of drains.

The agency submission refers to a Management Plan, but this was the original one produced in 1993 that morphed into the draft Environmental Impact Statement, and then became the officially recognised Environmental Impact Statement for the program. The submission also indicated that with the drain network and a commitment by landholders to improve pastures, the stock carrying capacity of the region (ie directly related to agricultural productivity) would increase by just under 15%. No new management plan appears to have been produced.

Shortly after the Progress Report was published, the Public Works Committee approved (PWC (1999)) Stage Two construction of a further 90 km of drains (Tilley Swamp (55km), Ballater East (22km) and Wongawilli (13km)). The Public Works Committee stated incorrectly (but as briefed by Primary Industries and Resources SA (PIRSA)) that "land degradation due to salinisation has increased significantly since the mid-1980s and if nothing is done, agricultural productivity loss is expected to be more than $9 million per year". Indeed, PIRSA's submission to the Public Works Committee grossly exaggerated the severity of the dryland salinity threat by stating that "the accelerated rate of dryland salinisation is principally caused by rising watertables resulting from the removal of nearly all the native vegetation cover in the region". The Public Works Committee had not been informed by PIRSA that monitoring of the now extensive network of observation wells in the region showed that watertables had been falling for the past 5 years.

The Public Works Committee was also not advised that the Fairview drain completed twelve months before was to have been a trial, and that subsequent stages of drain construction were only to have commenced after the trial drain's impacts and effectiveness had been determined. Indeed, PIRSA staff advised the Public Works Committee (Hansard (1999)) that "we are trying to accelerate the program as much as we can", as if the trial results were of no consequence. PIRSA advised the Public Works Committee that drains nominally 2 metres deep "have a drawdown effect within 1 to 2 kilometres from the drain", but did not advise that the trial drain was discharging 83% less groundwater than predicted in the draft Environmental Impact Statement (NRC (1993)).

Reports produced for the Program in 2002, and subsequently, confirm that Program staff have been misreporting or ignoring key information on drain performance and impacts. The trial drain's performance was significantly less than predicted (and performance has continued to degrade with time), and damage was being caused to pastures, wetlands and native vegetation and to soils as a result of drainage. None of these reports have been formally provided for public viewing, or are available on the Program's reports webpage.

PIRSA reported to the Public Works Committee that "with a coordinated drainage scheme in place and commitment by landholders to pasture improvement programs, stock carrying capacity will be boosted by [14%]", which "is in contrast with the 'do nothing' option of a long term decline in carrying capacity of just over 40%". The figures erroneously assumed that the 1992 predictions on the expansion of dryland salinity in the region remained valid. In 2002, when the Upper South East Dryland Salinity and Flood Management Bill (introduced only because of the Government's expectation that it would no receive cooperation from one named landholder!) was being debated in the South Australian parliament, parliamentarians were briefed that the proposed Upper South East drain network would increase productivity in the region by 100%, and that without it salinity would continue to increase (Hill, Hansard (2002)). There has never been any factual or reported basis for such statements, which were obviously designed to gain support from parliamentarians for the Bill.

The total cost of the Program was reported by PIRSA to be $63million, which comprised $24million (of which landholders were required to contribute $6million) for the drainage scheme, and $39million "provided by landholders and the Natural Heritage Trust for revegetation projects, pasture re-development and on-farm drainage". PIRSA also reported to the Public Works Committee that a "brief review of the [1993] economic analysis was undertaken in October 1999 by the South Australian Centre for Economic Studies and it was concluded that the assumptions made in 1992/1993 about agricultural productivity as still valid". In fact, the economic review was so brief that the Program decided not to publish it (together with several other key documents) on its reports webpage.

If the 1999 economic review had been thorough, rather than brief, it would have demonstrated that under-performing groundwater drains, damage caused by groundwater drainage on the environment, and a threat that had been receding for at least 5 years, would have had a major impact on the viability of the Program, reducing it from marginal to unviable! Presumably this is the real reason why the review was brief, and has not been published.

Coincidently, the next economic review (Wheeler (2002)) was conducted on a "tight deadline", and has also not been published on the Upper South East Program's website. However, a copy can be found on the Senate's Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts References Committee website by clicking here (2MB PDF file). After reading it and comparing its statements and recommendations with those of the Program, readers will understand why it has not been published on the Program's website!

In 2000, a salinity audit of South Australia estimated that the area affected by salinity in the Upper South Eats was 250,500ha (almost identical to the 1992 figure!), and illogically that a further 159,000ha was at risk by 2050, despite noting that watertables were falling! The report described its mapping methodology (aerial photography, and presumably digital elevation and watertable data), but which lacked "detailed ground truthing". By 2005, all Australian salinity audits conducted in 2000 had been discredited, starting with a series of articles in the November 2005 Farm Policy Journal, and in several radio, TV, and rural press articles that followed (see the media reports webpage).

Professor David Pannell of the University of Western Australia, an internationally-recognised expert in dryland salinity, stated recently that the audits "reinforced the atmosphere of alarm that existed in the late 1990s/early 2000s", they "gave the impression of unrealistically large areas facing salinity", "that it was a politicised process", and "even today ... the available predictions of future salinity impacts are pretty weak" (Pannell (2006)). Current estimates of land affected by dryland salinity are about a third of those estimated in 2000!

But in 2006, Program staff still cling on to the 1992 and 2000 figures of 250,500 ha (eg the Program information sheet titled confronting the questions (PDF file 1.8MB), and the home page of the Upper South East Program's website). Unfortunately, many landholders and parliamentarians ignorant of the real figures believe (and are alarmed by) the flawed information published by the Program.

In 2001, the South Australia Government, in conjunction with PIRSA, issued the "South Australian Dryland Salinity Strategy" (PIRSA (2001)). The strategy repeated previously described Upper South East salinity information, and also contained excellent advice on the need to:

How disappointing that Program staff have demonstrated through their actions that they have not read the Strategy. The Upper South East would have been in a far healthier condition now if they had!

2002 - 2004

Rural Solutions Economic Review of Program

In 2002, an update of the 1993 benefit:cost analysis of the Program (Wheeler et al (2002)) demonstrated that "the total net benefits from improved agricultural productivity do not outweigh the costs of the scheme". It then went on to state that an extreme test of the so-called environmental benefits transfer rules caused the BCR for the "central catchment model farm" to increase to 1.38, but that the size of the environmental values to produce this figure was "not realistic" - however, undeterred, the Program used the unrealistic figure of 1.38 in the case (DWLBC (2003a)) put to the Public Works Committee for funding the final stage of drain network construction ($21million)! A further $28million was also bid (and approved) for other activities, all over and above initial estimates. Catchment- and region-level BCRs corrected for environmental values, although not calculated in the update, would have been less than one. Barber's 1993 analysis estimated that the "model farm" BCR was around 50% greater than catchment and regional BCRs.

The Rural Solutions report then went on to acknowledge that "there have been negative environmental consequences of the drainage scheme, and if these effects were fully known and accounted for, then the overall values would be a lot less". The report stated that "if there are more increases in capital costs of the drainage scheme, then it is likely that the project will no longer be economic". The drainage component of the Program blew out from $24 million to $45 million, with the mandated landholder contribution nearly tripling from $6 million to $17 million, and the total Program cost tripling to over $73 million!

The Rural Solutions report identified many inconsistencies between, and deficiencies with, the original and the then current Program proposals, and inconsistencies and inequities in the process for determining cost-shares for the drain network component. Program staff's report to the Public Works Committee in 2003 (DWLBC (2003a)) illogically and very selectively used the Rural Solutions discussions on cost-shares as justification for an increase in the private contribution to the drainage scheme from 25% of project costs to more than 50% (which ignored landholder's private costs of post-drainage on-ground works, and a previous State Government commitment that Upper South East landholders should contribute no more than $6million to drain construction). The justification did not follow logically from the Rural Solutions discussions (which considered "polluter pays" and "beneficiary pays" principles, and obvious anomalies in the levy payment structure).

In general, central and southern catchment properties are more productive than northern catchment properties of similar area (primarily because of differences in rainfall and inherent soil fertility), which is reflected in significant differences in their capital value. Northern catchment properties would be expected to derive less benefit from drainage. Thus, the current levy based on land area (and not property capital value) results in northern catchment landholders effectively subsidising drain construction in the central and southern catchments.

Furthermore, some landholders in Zones B and C are now direct "beneficiaries" of the expanded drain network, but pay significantly lower levies than those in Zone A. Finally, the authors of the Rural Solutions report argued that on the basis of a "beneficiary pays" principle, "there is no justification for landholders in Zones C to D (some of B) to pay anything towards total costs". The bolded words are as written in the report. They considered that the "polluter pays" principle should never have been used as a principle in determining drainage levies, and recommended that a "beneficiary pays" principle is used to allocate cost shares.

The cost share arrangement now implemented has all the appearances of being contrived to keep alive the Program, by maximising total regional landholder levies, and minimising costs for benefiting landholders, especially those in the central and southern catchments. If not this, then the arrangement demonstrates a lack of understanding (or indifference) by Program staff of the economics of the Program, especially the combination of capital costs, and long-term environmental and economic costs, on the drain network's viability, and on landholder's ability to pay!

The 2002 Rural Solutions report, like the "brief" 1999 economic analysis of the Program produced by the South Australian Centre for Economic Studies, has not been published on the Program's reports webpage, presumably because of its revelations on the Program's viability. However, a copy of the Rural Solutions report has been published on the Senate's website, and can be accessed by clicking here (PDF file 2.25 MB).

Other Events

CSIRO reports (Fitzpatrick et al (2003, 2003a, 2004)) referred to the detrimental consequences of draining saline soils, the remediation required, and that native vegetation and puccinellia (a productive grazing pasture previously promoted by the Program for sowing on drained saline land) was dying close to drains!

A draft report (Telfer et al (2002)) on the Stage One Fairview trial drain was also prepared (but not formally published until May 2006), which indicated that a groundwater drawdown of greater than 0.5m was occurring at average distances from the drain of about 800m down-gradient and 1.5km up-gradient from the drain. The 0.5m drawdown extended no more than about 200m from the drain in some sections! Groundwater discharge to the drain was over 80% less than predicted by modelling, but this did not lead to a review of the technical basis for the Program. The report also stated that some of the drawdown was probably influenced by a local falling watertable trend that had been detected before the drain was constructed - that is, the actual drain-influenced drawdown was probably even less than quoted above.

One key but highly inconvenient paragraph in the original 2002 report had been removed in the 2006 version. The paragraph went as follows:

"Observation bores in the southeast of the study are show a universal downward water level trend, both before and after drain installation. This trend may be due [to] a combination of a local falling water level trend before drain construction, followed by a drain influenced trend. However, the simpler explanation is that it is a local trend uninfluenced by the drain."

Salinity targets set in 2002 for the Program by the Commonwealth, as a condition of NAP funding, had already been met without drains. One target set for 2010 (to reduce the area of saline land in the drained area by 30%) had probably been met well before 2002, and a target set for 2020 (to reduce the predicted rate of increase in salinity across all other salinity affected land by 50%) had almost definitely been met in 1993! A resource action target to plant deep-rooted perennial vegetation over 85,000 ha by 2007 was removed a year later, presumably when it was realised that at least 88,000 ha (considered a "gross underestimate") had already been planted. Unbelievable, but true.

Later in 2002, an Act was passed that facilitated the compulsory acquisition of drainage corridors without compensation, to enable the unobstructed completion of the drainage network. The Act also provided immunity against liability for any acts or omissions by Program staff and the State Government. Most parliamentarians gave their support to the Act, clearly because they had been advised that:

While the Act appears draconian, and according to the responsible minister at the time (John Hill) was only required to control just one landholder in the region, other acts still require government officials to behave honestly (eg the State's Public Sector Management Act 1995) and ensure that public money is efficiently and effectively spent (eg the Commonwealth's Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997).

In early 2003, CSIRO warned several Program staff of the adverse effects of draining saline-sodic and acid sulfate soils, and of the necessary pre-treatment to avoid problems occurring. This advice was not heeded, with the consequence that soil degradation is appearing close to and within newly constructed drains in the Upper South East. Landholders were also advised that their levy would triple to over $17million, an increase imposed this time without the community consultation and commitment that the State Cabinet insisted on in 1995. At the same time, a CSIRO economist reported that drains are rarely cost-effective in controlling dryland salinity!

In late 2003, Stage Three (comprising the construction of a further 410 km of drains) of the Program was approved by the PWC. Again, no reference was made to the relevance of the Stage One trial to subsequent decisions on drain construction, nor to the need to consider the issues listed in the EIS assessment report before embarking on the northern catchment scheme. The BCR of the drainage sub-program was reported by Program staff to the PWC to be 1.38, with none of PIRSA's caveats, a clear and gross exaggeration of figures that applied to catchments and the region. Although at least one member of the PWC was highly sceptical of arguments presented by Program and other staff (a review of the Hansard transcript is highly recommended, if only for the amusing comments), the committee process still appeared to more an exercise in rubber-stamping than in critical review.

Program staff also reported to the PWC that there remained many unknowns and divergent views about past surface water flows from the south to the Coorong. They also reported that consideration was being given to using a planned groundwater drain in the Padthaway region to discharge tailings from a proposed desalination plant, which would freshen over-extracted ground water and be available for growing grapes. In August 2005, Padthaway irrigators reported that they did not want a groundwater drain, preferring improved surface water management that would result in the diminishing and degraded groundwater in the region being replenished!

In October 2003, a drainage consultant questioned the subjective basis on which runoff factors for the drains in the northern catchment had been designed. The consultant noted that runoff to a drain was influenced mainly by cumulative rainfall over a period of several months, and not by particular storm events; ie soils need to be wet to depth before significant runoff will occur. The design of the downstream drain sections remained unchanged, and landholders have now been advised that they are at least three times, and probably close to ten times, larger (and hence more expensive to construct and maintain) than required for the expected drain flows. Peak flows this winter were just 3% of the design capacity (ie 30 times over-designed!). Program staff recently defended their position on deep drains by arguing that a projected increase in storm events (and hence runoff) will counter the effects of declining rainfall in the region, which is a contradiction of the consultant's advice.

In mid 2004, as part of their ongoing campaign of misinforming the public about the threat from dryland salinity, Program staff continued to claim that 40% of the Upper South East was saline, and further 27% was at risk, "resulting in estimated annual production losses of $436million" (Willis (2004)), nearly 50X larger than the figure estimated in 1993 (Barber (1993)), and reported in the draft Environmental Impact Statement (NRC (1993))! A figure 2X larger than the 1993 figure might be explained by inflation, but 50X can only be explained by imagination.

In late 2004, the Australian National Audit Office reported (ANAO (2004) - 2.7MB PDF file) on a review of the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality (NAP). NAP is a national initiative agreed in November 2000 involving expenditure of $1.4billion over 7 years "to motivate and enable regional communities to use coordinated and targeted action to prevent, stabilise and reverse trends in dryland salinity affecting the sustainability of production, the conservation of biological diversity and the viability of infrastructure; and improve water quality and secure reliable allocations for human uses, industry and the environment". NAP is the major source of funding for the final stage of the Upper South East Program, with the balance of 25% being charged to landholders in the form of levies.

A key finding of the audit was that "It is essential to demonstrate that program funds are well targeted and likely to achieve a value for money result within the anticipated timeframe". Read on to find out what other government reviews think about how the Program is (not) achieving this requirement!

2005 to now

2005 is when landholders started to become aware that they had been misinformed by Program staff for several years, and that their claims on the threat from dryland salinity and the benefits of groundwater drainage had been grossly exaggerated. In the face of growing, officially-reported evidence, Program staff still appear to be in a state of denial, and continue to sustain flawed, decade-old predictions. Some even today stick rigidly to the early 1990's line, presumably on Crown Law advice known to have been received in mid 2005.

In early 2005, CSIRO and Program staff informed landholders that watertables had been generally falling in the Upper South East since 1993, without drains. All previous analyses, and hence the justification for the drain network, had thus been based on flawed predictions. However, as recently as a few months ago, Program staff still reported that dryland salinity was increasing in the region. Presumably, they believed that to report otherwise would have damaged the credibility of the Program - or at least, that's what they thought!

In June 2005, several Upper South East landholders refused to pay their levies. Program staff also admitted that an objective of the Program was now to "sustain health in the Coorong" by supplementing it with flows from the drainage scheme. Up to 2002, a Program objective had been to reduce the detrimental impacts of drainage water on the Coorong, by minimising flows! In August 2005, the Minister admitted that discussions were occurring with the Commonwealth to negotiate an increase in Upper South East drainage flows to the Coorong!

Recent research reports

In August 2005, CSIRO reported (Cox et al (2005a)) on studies of the likely impacts of a drain on the Bald Hill flat in the central catchment. The report raised serious concerns about the adequacy of information used to predict the effects of drains. The report published predictions on drain effectiveness, but with several caveats, for example that "even though the model shows the drain may have an impact over several kilometres, the drawdown with distance from the drain rapidly decreases and may be less than required to prevent the groundwater from reaching the surface each year within a short distance from the drain".

The report did not quantify the impact of a drain on surface water flows off the flat to the adjacent watercourse and wetlands. Dewatering of soils will inevitably reduce runoff to wetlands already stressed by reduced watercourse flows, which have been diverted away by up-stream LSE drains. Many landholders fear that a demand for deep drains to lower groundwater tables (that are falling naturally anyway) and a requirement for increased water flows to the Coorong could result in the sacrifice of the few remaining Upper South East wetlands.

The CSIRO report also noted:

CSIRO also showed that watertables "statistically corrected" for rainfall variations could be shown to be rising in 57% of observation wells, but only for a period of about two years to 2004. When extended to the period since 1993, the statistical analysis showed flat or falling trends in 95% of wells analysed.

A report (still to be published) on a study of the soils adjacent to the Fairview trial drain identifies sodicity effects that are impacting on drain effectiveness. Closely spaced sand columns (10-15cm diameter, 1 - 2m spacing) recently identified in the clayey sub-soils of the Upper South East are also expected to result in top-soil fresh water being preferentially drained into, and hence lost to, the underlying saline groundwater in the vicinity of deep drains, while salts remain in the sodic sub-soils. A review of the Fairview drain trial has only recently occurred, after about 450km of the 650km network has been constructed!

Didicoolum Drain Extension

REM report.

REM (Resource and Environmental Management Pty Ltd), an Adelaide-based company, was engaged in 2005 by the South Australian Government's Department of Water Land and Biodiversity Conservation to undertake an assessment of the likely impacts of the proposed Didicoolum Drain extension on local groundwater levels beneath the Marcollat Flat. The report can be accessed by clicking here (4.9MB PDF file).

REM's report (Richardson and Poulsen (2005)) was "intended to provide an objective understanding of the relative potential impacts of drainage and wetland management scenarios on the shallow aquifer underlying the inter-dunal flat". The report failed to consider all mechanisms that contribute to dryland salinity and environmental flows, and did not assess the economic and environmental impacts of groundwater drainage.

Perceptions of bias and conflict of interest

Perceptions of bias and conflict of interest prevent the report's results being taken seriously. Richardson, a report author, and McCarthy, the report’s peer reviewer, were employed to represent the Coalition of Concerned Landholders (CCL) in last year’s Senate inquiry into the extent and economic impact of salinity (click here for more details). The CCL is a group of farmers that have lobbied the State Government for over a decade for the construction of groundwater drains in the Upper South East.

When the report was being finalised, McCarthy’s name was listed in the Adelaide hearings’ program (40kB PDF file). The list of witnesses attending the Senate hearing also includes McCarthy’s and Richardson’s names, and the Hansard transcript of the hearing (page 36, 468kB PDF file) indicates that Richardson produced the CCL’s submission (1.6MB PDF file) for the Senate inquiry. Mr Rasheed is recorded to have said that “Don McCarthy and Stuart Richardson are consultants we are employing to help us with the science side of the issues”.

McCarthy claimed that groundwater drains are required, because without them, watertables would rise, and cited a CSIRO report (believed to be Cox et al, 2005a) as evidence of this. Richardson also wrote (submission 43, page 1) that “Dryland salinity is due to rising groundwater levels”, and later claimed that the “Purpose of groundwater drainage is to return groundwater levels back to what they were”.

However, in 2005, watertable levels on the Marcollat Flat and adjacent dune ranges were similar to or lower than when records began, without drains. In 2007, watertables are lower. In some cases, records began nearly 40 years ago, when dryland salinity was not a recorded problem in the region. A conclusion that should be drawn from this observation is that current salinity problems on the Marcollat Flat are not caused by rising groundwater.

The CSIRO report (Cox et al, 2005a), also referred to by Richardson in submission 43, correlated historical watertable trends with rainfall, and furthermore did not consider the effects on watertable levels of vegetation or revegetation. CSIRO (Walker, 2005) advised the Upper South East Program that revegetation of 50-90% of the dunes and associated areas with deep-rooted perennial vegetation, such as lucerne and native vegetation, should restore the groundwater balance in the region. Walker claimed that this would decrease land salinisation, and revert the land to pre-cleared conditions without recourse to groundwater drains.

A “balanced solution”, according to Richardson, is one that “takes into account the need to protect agricultural productivity and the need to protect ecological health”. Richardson’s proposed “balanced solution” is a solution using groundwater drains to produce a balanced outcome. This is not a balanced solution!

A balanced, or optimum, solution comprises a mix of drain, revegetation, and soil management options, that maximise the ratio of economic and environmental benefits to the economic and environmental costs.

Richardson, also described the history of the Willalooka Pastoral Company property. He claimed that following clearance of scrub in 1955, stocking rates on the property declined by 50% in the period to 1980, apparently caused by increased soil salinity. He went on to claim that “the watertable gradually rose over the next 20 years [from 1980 to 2000]”. This observation is incorrect - click here (664kB PDF file) for watertable records.

Richardson went on to describe what he believed to be the causes of dryland salinity, but failed to demonstrate an understanding of the relationship between all mechanisms that contribute to dryland salinity, eg groundwater and surface water interactions, watertables, soil health and structure, vegetation cover, and recharge on the dunes and associated areas.

The perception of a deep drains' bias (by both REM and the report's sponsor, the Department of Water, Land and Biodiversity Conservation), and raised in writing as a concern by a program official (Leak, 2005) was not addressed in the report’s section 1.2. REM's authors claimed in section 1.2 that they "have also been engaged by other stakeholders to deal with specific issues relating to the proposed drain, this assessment has been undertaken in an objective manner and has been peer reviewed by DWLBC to ensure the integrity of the findings and recommendations contained in this report".

Hydrological testing

The report (section 2.2) describes the testing method used to measure hydrological data used in REM’s modeling. The tests were completed on the 12th and 13th May 2005. The discussion of the measured data identifies a major discrepancy (up to 300-fold) with previously recorded data (section 2.3.2).

Furthermore, the period from about October to May is typically when watertables fall to their lowest level. Indeed, the watertable records show that in April and May 2005, watertables on the flat were below the proposed bed level of the drain (2m). The most representative time to measure aquifer properties for use in drain effectiveness studies is when watertables are close to or at their peak (Leak, 2005), which is generally in August or September.

Temporal changes to soil properties (eg drained, previously salt-affected soils become less permeable because of sodicity) were also not considered in REM’s analysis.

Section 10, paragraph 8 of the REM report states that: "To gain greater confidence in the potential performance of drains in the Upper South East it is recommended that a model be developed for the Fairview Drain that is similar to the models that have been prepared for the proposed Didicoolum Drain. Groundwater monitoring undertaken prior to drain construction and following drain construction at the Fairview Drain site provides a unique opportunity to check model predictions against actual performance. It is expected that this type of modelling can support future reviews of drain performance."

A thorough evaluation of the performance of the Fairview Drain should have been conducted in 1999 - it was a requirement of the program's Environmental Impact Statement. The Fairview Drain was always meant to be a trial, and it is always good science to validate the predictions of any modelling, most especially when the predictive models are then used to underpin future multi-million dollar public investments. It is scandalous that model validation has never been performed, which is an extremely poor reflection on the professionalism of State Government officials responsible for managing and implementing the drainage program.

Work that could have been used to validate the 1992 drain modelling commenced in 2002, but stalled, one can only presume because the initial conclusions did not support the preconceptions of State Government officials on deep drain performance. One conclusion drawn in a draft report (Telfer et al (2002), click here to read more) was that the 1992 predictions over-estimated groundwater drainage flows by more than five times, presumably because hydrological data used in the modelling had been collected when watertables were at their lowest (April 1992).

Lower than expected drainage flows translate to a reduced impact on watertable levels, and hence on the ability of deep drains to control dryland salinity in the region. In turn, if reduced groundwater drain performance had been incorporated into the economic assessment of the program conducted in 2002, it would undoubtedly have resulted in the program being reclassified from barely viable at best, to grossly uneconomic and unsustainable. Public funding would never have been provided with this economic assessment, and Government officials would have been forced to give greater priority to other options for dryland salinity and flood management, such as surface drainage, revegetation, improving soil health etc.

Clearly concerned about the accuracy of their modelling, the report's authors (see in particular Section 10, paragraphs 4 and 5 of the REM Executive Summary) stated that: "Further development of this modelling approach should include a more comprehensive assessment of the hydraulic conductivity of the aquifer with a pumping aquifer test"; and "Further structured sensitivity analysis would be useful in assessing the impact of uncertainty and variability in model input parameters". These are reasonable recommendations, but should have been implemented in the late 1990s, well before the current stage of drain construction!

The REM report appears to be one selectively cited by State Government officials (including the responsible Minister (Gail Gago)) and some landholders as the source of science that supports the continuation of groundwater drain digging. The Government's interpretation of the "science" has been grossly deficient for well over a decade, which is transparently obvious to anybody who takes the time to read and understand any of the technical reports produced for the program.

Ministerial Submission

The Didicoolum Drain Ministerial Submission (MINSUB (2005), click here to read a copy) refers to a number of documents and sources of information, including the above REM report, and three reports covering a soil analysis (Durkay, 2004), a hydrogeological assessment (GHD, 2004), and a pasture assessment (Horizon, 2004). Reviews and originals of all reports can be accessed by clicking here.

The Ministerial Submission dismissed the general conclusion of the three reports that a “deep drain would not be the best outcome for the Marcollat Flat” with the claim that “it was concluded there was inadequate assessment made of the observations and trends in watertables and the consequent dryland salinity risks that have been previously well documented in the [Upper South East]”. The inference was that watertables would continue to rise without drains. The Government’s records show the opposite.

Furthermore, the Ministerial Submission failed to report REM's concerns on the quality of the modelling in support of the design of the Didicoolum Drain, nor referred to the opportunity to validate earlier modelling using the results of the Fairview Drain! The attitude of State Government officials appears to be that drains will be dug regardless of whether the science supports them or not.

Probably even more damning of State Government officials is evidence that they ignored concerns raised by the Crown Solicitor (section 9, but relevant paragraphs removed in the publicly released document). State Government officials were warned that their intended change to the Didicoolum Drain alignment, as originally defined in the Regulation to the Upper South east Dryland Salinity and Flood Management Act, might be found to be illegal, if proper parliamentary processes were not followed.

The officials ignored the advice, and pressed on with drain digging. After landholders successfully challenged the State Government in the Supreme Court, drain digging was stopped, and only continued after the responsible Minister (Gail Gago) was forced to certify two amended Regulations. There is still a risk that drain digging might be found to be illegal if the Legislative Council (where the Government lacks a majority) or the Legislative Review Committee vote to disallow the Regulation. A motion of disallowance of the first amended Regulation was made on 30 May - the debate continues.

CSIRO Position Papers

In response to adverse publicity arising from criticism of the Upper South East Program from landholders and the South Australian Department for Environment and Heritage, in particular in inquiries conducted by State Parliament and Senate committees, the Program's sponsor and Board chairman, Roger Wickes, in early September 2005 requested from the Chief of CSIRO Land and Water, Dr Rob Vertessey, a "consolidated CSIRO position statement be provided in relation to the technical understanding of USE [Upper South East] processes and proposed solutions to deal with risks". The position statement (in fact, four position papers were produced) was "seen [by Wickes] as a way of ensuring a clear message is provided to all Upper South East landholders and to help address the misinterpretation of information". Remember the word "misinterpretation"!

Presumably Program staff did not get the response they expected, because, two years later, Upper South East landholders are still waiting for CSIRO's "clear message"! Like the nine background papers produced for the program in 2002, and a large number of other inconvenient scientific papers produced since the program started in the early 1990s, the CSIRO position papers have not been officially released to landholders.

The papers were provided to the State Government in November 2005, and covered four topics:

Changes in groundwater balance.

The paper described the regional groundwater flow system under the Upper South East, which comprises a number of inter-linked aquifers in a transmissive system that flows slowly from the east in western Victoria to the South Australian coast in the west. The groundwater balance changed as a result of the loss deep-rooted perennial vegetation from dunes preceding and during the 1980s, which increased root zone drainage. Increased groundwater recharge raises watertables when recharge exceeds the discharge capacity of the underlying aquifer. When watertables are close to the land surface on the inter-dunal flats, water is lost by evapotranspiration, which concentrates salts at the land surface and in the root zone.

The paper noted that recharge rates under mallee-form Eucalyptus vegetation found on dunes was measured to be less than 1mm/year, and under annual pastures to be 50-80mm/year. On the interdunal flats, while discharge might have increased, hydrological processes are complex and variable, both spatially and seasonally. Salts can be leached during winter, when recharge exceeds discharge, and then become concentrated again at the land surface during summer. Roots can grow and die in response to movements in the watertable, surface water flows, and changes in soil and groundwater salinity. Seasonal vegetation growth patterns will also affect salt concentration as a result of evapotranspiration.

Symptoms of changes in groundwater balance, such as increased salt in the vicinity of the land surface, a rise in the watertable at the end of summer, increased waterlogging and run-off, vegetation dieback, evidence of salt-tolerant species, "have been brought about by a change of water balance on the dunes". However, in order to reduce recharge to the extent that it can be transported in aquifer flows requires that it be reduced to 80-90% of its original value, which would "imply that 90% of dunes and associated areas to be covered by low recharge vegetation such as lucerne". Other modelling work cited in the paper "suggested that a 50% recharge reduction would lead to a decrease in land salinisation, although not reversing it entirely".

Cann et al (1992) identified 256,000ha (of a total land area of 684,000ha) of land with elevations of two metres or more above surrounding flats, or 37% of the region. Assuming this figure includes all land defined as dunes, at least 230,400ha (90% of 256,000ha, or 34% of the region) of the Upper South East would need to be covered with deep-rooted perennial vegetation to restore the region's groundwater balance. This area is considerably less than the regional target of 55% cover with perennial agricultural vegetation and 20% cover with native vegetation that "should be achieved by 2005", according to the 1995 Environmental Impact Statement!

According to McEwan et al (2002), the area of the Upper South East covered by perennial vegetation in 2002 was 38.3%, but lucerne coverage (12.9% quoted) based on funded plantings only may have been underestimated by as much as five times. That is, perennial vegetation cover in the Upper South East already appears to exceed the threshold levels at which recharge is reduced sufficiently to decrease land salinisation, and might be the principal reason why watertables have been falling!

The report noted that during the initial period, that is the period of re-planting vegetation to achieve the perennial cover, "the use of engineering [drains] to protect valuable land or environmental areas may be considered".

The conclusions appear straightforward: re-plant dunes with perennial deep-rooted vegetation, with a target of 230,400ha (34% of the region), and a groundwater balance in the region will be achieved; engineering might be required as an interim measure to protect key assets. Click here to read the final page of the position paper.

However, in a subsequent version of the position paper, a member of the Program staff distorted the simple conclusion by adding a summary which stated that "80-90% of the land surface [would need to be] covered with deep-rooted vegetation or pastures to restore the groundwater balance", which "was considered to be an unattainable target", and that "consequently, an engineering solution in the form of drainage is required to restore the groundwater balance to discharge water from the soil by the drain that would otherwise be evaporated"! The inference conveyed to non-expert readers of the summary is that 80-90% of all of the Upper South East, and not just the dunes, would need to be covered with perennial vegetation in order to control dryland salinity (an area nearly three time greater than advised), and so continued drain construction becomes justified.

Minister Gago then used the Government's misinterpretation (remember, the original intent of the CSIRO position papers was "seen as a way of ensuring a clear message is provided to all Upper South East landholders and to help address the misinterpretation of information") as justification for continued drain construction, during the debate on the Upper South East Act extension in 2006. Click here and search for CSIRO.

Minister Gago has still failed to justify continued drain digging, even though challenged formally on the Government's misinterpretation in the Legislative Council in May 2007. Click here and search again for CSIRO. The Minister did not answer the question she was asked, and indeed referred to the REM report, discussed above. As REM acknowledged in their report, but which was asserted otherwise by the Minister in the Legislative Council, the science is inadequate and does not stack up.

Groundwater and salinity trends.

To be completed.

Salinity, sodicity and high pH in drained soils.

To be completed.

Sulfidic materials in drains.

To be completed.

SA Parliament Environment Resources and Development Committee

To be completed.

Senate Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts References Committee

The Senate's ECITA Committee completed an inquiry into the extent and economic impact of salinity, and published its report titled "The extent and economic impact of salinity in Australia" in March 2006. The inquiry was wide-ranging, and the Committee's brief was "to examine the long-term success of federal programs that seek to reduce the extent and economic impact of salinity in the Australian environment". Although principally a top-level review, the Committee made the Upper South East Program the focus of the only case study contained in its report.

Key relevant points:

Review for Natural Heritage Trust and National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality

In late 2004 and early 2005, the Natural Heritage Ministerial Board agreed to ten national evaluations of the Natural Heritage Trust and the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality. The report "Evaluation of salinity outcomes of regional investment" (2.6MB PDF file), published in April 2006, provides a number of significant comments relevant to the Upper South East Program: